Normal Form Games:
Generally, in normal form games players chose their strategies simultaneously and the combination of strategies chosen by each player determine payoff for each player. Thus, normal form game specifies
1) A set of players
2) Pure strategy space for each player denoted by S, (the subscript i denotes the ith player)
si ∈ Sj (Read si belongs to Si)
where, si is an element of Si,
3) Payoff fhnction of the game. This function determines what the players will get in her hand after the players have chosen their strategies. For firms it could be profits, for consumers it could be utility etc. Payoff of a player is a function of strategies simultaneously chosen by her and the other players.
is the payoff function of the ith player where, s= (s1, s2, s3,. . . . . . S(n-1), sn) is the vector of strategies where si is the strategy picked up by the ith player.
In this kind of game we assume that 1) each player knows the game 2) each player is rational. Rationality is common knowledge. That is the ith player knows that her rival knows that she is rational. Definition: The normal form representation of a nplayer game specifies the players' strategy spaces S1, S2, S3 Sn and their payoff function ul, uz, us un We denote the game by
We will illustrate the normal form game by a classic example - The prisoners' dilemma.
Example: Two suspects are arrested and charged with a crime. The police lack suff~cient evidence to convict the suspects, unless at least one of them confesses. The police hold the suspects in two separate cells and explain the consequences that will follow from the actions they could take. If neither of them confesses then both will be convicted of a minor offence and sentenced to one month in jail. If botn of them confess, then both will be sentenced to six months in jail. Finally, if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will be released immediately but the other will be sentenced to nine months in jail- six for the crime and the other three of obstructing justice.
The prisoners' problem could be expressed by a 2x2 matrix. There are two numbers in parenthesis in each cell of the matrix, the first number is the payoff of the prisoner1 and the second one is the payoff of the 2nd player.
In this game
1) There are 2 players, two prisoners.
2) Strategy set for both the players is the same S, = { NC, C), i=1,2.
3) The payoff functions of both the players (Prisoner) are described below
Can you solve the problem of the prisoners and suggest them what is their optimum strategy in such a situation. Argue whether that combination of strategies is stable or not.
Although we stated that in a normal form game players chose their strategies simultaneously but this does not imply that they act simultaneously. It suffices that each player chose her action without the knowledge of the others' choice. Though we said that in normal form games players move simultaneously, sequential form games can also be represented in a normal form. But the extensive form representation of such games is often more convenient framework for analyzing such dynamic issues.