Repeated games:

First we will deal with games, which  are  repeated twice. Only  then we will explore finitely repeated games and finally infinitely repeated games. We will discuss celebrated Friedman's theorem. You will  be  given an application of the theory, what happens when the Cournot duopoly model is analyzed under infinite repetition.  You  will apply  game  theory  to  bargaining problems, application of  'which  is  rampant  in  almost  every social, economic and commercial issue, domestic as well as international.  

Repeated games are simply repetition of the stage game over time. The stage game  is repeated after the payoffs have been  collected. Therefore, analysis of these games  involve  a  lot  of considerations,  such  as  present value of  the payoff, strategies  are also  complicated. By appropriately choosing the strategy, players can ensure that  in  a repeated game the outcome at each stage is  not  the Nash equilibrium  of the stage  game.  Any  feasible payoff which gives each  player more  (or at  least equal) payoff  than  the Nash  equilibrium gives can be achieved as the outcome of the game given some restrictions on the discount factor.

Bargaining  is  a most frequent problem  in  economics, society and business. Bargaining solution can be achieved involving two  persons  using  game theory.  A  bargaining solution, which satisfies  the axioms  stated by Nash,  is called the Nash bargaining solution. In  infinitely repeated game, players can  achieve  more than the  Nash equilibrium permits by  colluding among themselves.