Structural Problems:

The  WTO  has the basic objective of  liberalisation of trade  in  goods and services and protection of intellectual property rights (PR). Liberalisation of trade results in  expansion of exports and directly benefits the countries with developed supply capacity. Protection of  IPR gives monopoly privileges resulting in high financial returns to the owners of PR and thus benefits the countries having IPR. Most of the developing countries have neither a good supply base for goods and services and nor much of the PR.  Thus the very objective of the WTO is such  that the prospects for direct gains  for the  developing countries are much smaller than those  for the developed countries.

Then the process of liberalisation, as specified in the preamble to the WTO Agreement,  is  "reciprocal and mutually advantageous  arrangements". Reciprocity in liberalisation can be usefil among countries at nearly similar level of  development. It has severe limitations  when  the participating countries cover a wide range of levels of development as is the case in the WTO. Reciprocity implies "getting more by giving more".  If a country is capable of giving only "less",  it  is bound  to get "less".  Such a system clearly enhances disparity between the countries which can give and those which cannot. The widening cycle of giving and getting will bring ever increasing benefit to the strong parties; whereas the weaker ones will remain on the fringe as  they have not much to offer. Some correctives have been attempted fiom time to time, like the special and differential  (S&D) treatment of  the developing countries but all this has not worked quite satisfactorily, as will be explained in the later section.

Further, there is a basic and structural  handicap of the developing countries  in enforcing  their rights in  the WTO. When  they perceive that their rights have been violated and  they take  to  the  dispute settlement process, the ultimate weapon for  enforcing  their  right is through retaliation. It may be appropriate  in a system where the members have similar strength, but  it is  grossly  inadequate  in  the  WTO  system, where  the membership is spread over a vastly differing economic and political strength. It puts the developing countries  that are the weak partners in the system, at a serious disadvantage. For them, retaliation against a major developed country has both economic cost and political cost. Thus their capacity for enforcement of rights and obligations gets very much constrained.