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Write two methods for the mouse trap game (using your board created in Assignment 3) and an event handler (another method) to test the two methods.
1. world.raise(item) where raise is a world-level method with one object-type parameter named "item". The method will raise the object item that is passed as the argument. This method will be used to raise obstacles to trap the mouse (or other vermin), so the distance that the object item is raised will depend on the size of the obstacles in your world.
2. mouse.jump(target) where jump is a method for the mouse (or other vermin) object with one object-type parameter named target. The method will cause the mouse to jump from its current position to the target position. You should have the mouse turn in the direction of its jump before jumping so that it is a realistic jump.
3. hw5(item) where hw5 is an event handler to test your methods with one object-type parameter named item. The event handler will respond to the mouse click event as: "When the mouse is clicked on anything do hw5(object_under_mouse_cursor)". The event handler will examine a world-level variable (that you must create) named "count" for conditional execution. If the value of count is 0, then the event handler will call world.raise(item) to raise the object that the user clicked, then set the value of count to 1. If the value of count is 1, then the event handler will call mouse.jump(item) to have the mouse jump to the object that the user clicked, then set the value of count to 0. In the method that is called when the world starts, set the world-level variable count to 0. Then, when the user first clicks on a place on the board, that place will be raised. When the user next clicks on a place on the board, the mouse (or other vermin) will move to that place. In subsequent clicks, the sequence of raising an obstacle and moving the mouse will repeat. Of course, when the game is finished, there will be testing to make sure that only obstacles are raised and that obstacles are raised only once and the user will not move the mouse, but we are building modules that will be used in the finished game. Thus, you will be able to do things that you will take care of in a future assignment (such as making sure not to raise a cylinder that is already raised, etc).
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