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A class of games of imperfect data during which one player (the principal) tries to supply incentives to the opposite (the agent) to encourage the agent to act within the principal's best interest. Often, such incentives are given to beat the ethical hazard drawback during which the agent has inadequate incentives to perform.
Perfect Nash equilibrium Two students prepare their homework assignment together for a course. They both enjoy getting high grade for their assignment, but they dislike workin
A static game is one during which all players build choices (or choose a strategy) simultaneously, while not information of the methods that are being chosen by different players.
Stanley is auctioning an item that he values at zero. Betty and Billy, the two potential buyers, each have independent private values which are drawn from a uniform distribution, P
Scenario Two corporations should simultaneously elect a technology to use for his or her compatible merchandise. If the corporations adopt totally different standards, few sales
A sequential game is {one of|one among|one in all|one amongst|one in each of} excellent data if just one player moves at a time and if every player is aware of each action of the p
A uniform worth auction may be a multiunit auction during which each winning bidder pays identical worth, which can or might not be equal to the participants' bids. Alternatively,
This is Case of Competitive Games. Player 2 L R Player 1 L (60,40) (70,30) R (65,35) (60,40) Are either have dominant st
A multiunit auction mechanism for assigning heterogeneous (different) objects. The highest bidder in the first round selects one item among those offered for sale. Then, a second r
The most basic version of a LIV allows the executive office holder (Governor or President) to accept part of a bill passed by the legislature (so that part becomes law) and to veto
Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N
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