1. Consider the following game:

a) Does either player have a dominant strategy?

b) Does either player have a (pure) prudent strategy?

c) Does the game have a saddlepoint in pure strategies?

2. Consider the following game:

a) Does either player have dominated strategies?

b) Reduce the game matrix by the iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), and draw the new game in normal form.

c) Does either player have a (pure) prudent strategy?

d) Does the game have a saddlepoint in pure strategies?

e) Does the game have a saddlepoint in mixed strategies?

f) What is the value of the game?

3. Consider the following game:

a) Does either player have a (pure) prudent strategy?

b) Does the game have a saddlepoint in pure strategies?

c) Does the game have a saddlepoint in mixed strategies?

d) What is the value of the game?