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Consider the following three games (Chicken, Matching Pennies, Stag Hunt):
Chicken Player 2
Player 1
D V
D -100;-100 10;-10
V -10; 10 -1;-1
Matching Pennies Player 2
H T
H 1;-1 -1; 1
T -1; 1 1;-1
Stag Hunt Player 2
S R
S 5; 5 0; 1
R 1; 0 1; 1
(a) In each of the above games, identify the pure strategy Nash Equilibria when both players move simultaneously
(b) Now imagine that player 1 chooses her action .rst, and player 2 observes player 1.s choice before choosing her action. What will be subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome of each game? (you do not need to be very formal in this question. An explanation based on your answer to a. will be enough).
(c) In which game(s) is there a .rst mover advantage? In which game(s) is there a second mover advantage? Does making the game sequential ever bene.t both players?
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