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Scenario
The hawk-dove game is additionally commonly called the sport of chicken. 2 hooligans with one thing to prove drive at one another on a slender road. The primary to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves, however, a terminal fate plagues each. Within the hawk-dove version of the story, hooligans are replaced by armies considering attending to war.
Description
There are 2 pure strategy equilibria. a unique pure strategy equilibrium is most well-liked by every player. each equilibria are Pareto optimal. A mixed strategy equilibrium conjointly exists.
Example
Driver 2
stay
swerve
Driver 1
-100,-100
1,-1
-1,1
0,0
General Form
Player 2
L
R
Player 1
U
a,w
b,x
D
c,y
d,z
Where the following relations hold: b>d>c>a y>z>x>w
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