Full equilibrium strategy example, Game Theory

Assignment Help:

 (a) A player wins if she takes the total to 100 and additions of any value from 1 through 10 are allowed. Thus, if you take the sum to 89, you are guaran- teed to win; your opponent must take the sum to at least 90 but can take it no higher than 99. In either case you can get to 100 on the next move. Using rollback, you can show that you can win if you can get the sum to 78 or to 67 . . . or to 12 or to 1. Thus, being the first mover and using a strategy that entails choosing 1 on the first move and then saying 11 minus whatever your opponent says allows you to win; you take the sum successively to 12, 23, . . ., 78, 89, and 100.

Technically, the full equilibrium strategy is

(i) if you are the first player, start with 1;

(ii) if the current total is not (100 – 11n) for some n, then choose the number that will bring the total to this form; or

(iii) if the current total is of the form (100 – 11n), then choose any number (all choices are equally bad).


(b) In this version, you lose if you force the total to equal or exceed 100, so you can win if you take the total to 99. Using the same type of analysis as  above, you see that you can win if you can get the sum to 88, 77, . . ., 22, or 11. This time you want to be the second mover. Your strategy should be to say 11 minus whatever your opponent says; this strategy takes you successively to 11, 22, . . ., 77,88, 99, and a win.

The full equilibrium strategy is

(i) if you are the first player, choose any number (all choices are equally bad);

(ii) if the current total is a multiple of 11, choose any number (all choices are equally bad); or

(iii) if the current total is not a multiple of 11, choose the number that will make the total a multiple of 11 (this is equivalent to choosing 11 minus the number just chosen by your opponent).


Related Discussions:- Full equilibrium strategy example

Grim trigger strategy, A trigger strategy sometimes applied to repeated pri...

A trigger strategy sometimes applied to repeated prisoner's dilemmas during which a player begins by cooperating within the initial amount, and continues to cooperate till one defe

Games with sequential moves, Games with Sequential Moves Most students ...

Games with Sequential Moves Most students find the idea of rollback very simple and natural, even without drawing or understanding trees. Of course, they start by being able to

Prisoners’ dilemma game, The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game The idea th...

The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game The idea that tacit cooperation can be sustained in an ongoing relationship is very simple and students easily accept it. The formal analysis

Tic tac toe, i have to make a tic tac toe game in matlab i dun have any ide...

i have to make a tic tac toe game in matlab i dun have any idea what to do?

Swertres computation, please compute this number 885 for the swertres lotto...

please compute this number 885 for the swertres lotto game.

Determine nash equilibria, Consider the electoral competition game presente...

Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution

Fighting for survival, Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is wo...

Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is worth v to each animal. The cost of fighting is c1 for the first animal (player 1) and c2 for the second animal (player 2). If the

Payoffs, mixed strategy game with ordinal and cardinal payoffs example plea...

mixed strategy game with ordinal and cardinal payoffs example please

Multiple item auction, Normal 0 false false false EN-US...

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE

Write Your Message!

Captcha
Free Assignment Quote

Assured A++ Grade

Get guaranteed satisfaction & time on delivery in every assignment order you paid with us! We ensure premium quality solution document along with free turntin report!

All rights reserved! Copyrights ©2019-2020 ExpertsMind IT Educational Pvt Ltd