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Game Theory:
(prisoner's dilemma) Consider the following 2 x 2 pricing game, where rms choose whether to price High or Low simultaneously. Find the equilibrium in dominant strategies.
(coordination game) Consider the following 2 x 2 coordination game, where two rms (Firm A and Firm B) simultaneously choose product standard A or B. The payo matrix is given by
Find all Nash equilibria of this game.
(early-mover advantage) Again the two rms play the above coordination game. But now suppose Firm A moves rst. After observing Firm A's choice, Firm B subsequently chooses A or B. Draw the extensive form (game tree) of this game. Use backwards induction to identify the (subgame perfect) equilibrium.
a) Define the term Nash equilibrium b) You are given the following pay-off matrix: Strategies for player 1 Strategies for player 2
Consider the following three games (Chicken, Matching Pennies, Stag Hunt): Chicken Player 2 Player 1 D V D -100;-100 10;-10 V -10; 10 -1;-1 Matching Pennies Pla
The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game The idea that tacit cooperation can be sustained in an ongoing relationship is very simple and students easily accept it. The formal analysis
Paired Prisoners' Dilemma Students can be paired off and instructed to play several ver-sions of a particular game with a prisoners' dilemma structure.Provide each pair with a
Matching Pennies Scenario To determine who is needed to try to to the nightly chores, 2 youngsters initial choose who are represented by "same" and who are represented by "diffe
GAME PLAYING IN CLASS There are several games that are appropriate for use on the first or second day of class. These games are simple but can be used to convey important poin
1. Consider two firms producing an identical product in a market where the demand is described by p = 1; 200 2Y. The corresponding cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1 and c 2
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Rules of Snake Eyes (small variation on game called Craps in USA) Player rolls two dice. On the first roll if the total of the dice is 2 (snake eyes): player wins and rece
Rollback shows that Boeing chooses peace over war if Airbus enters, so Airbus will enter. Rollback equilibrium entails Airbus playing “Enter” and Boeing playing “Peace if entry”; e
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