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Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution of voters with median m and the candidate whose policy is closest to the median wins the election and the winning candidate's policy is implemented. If the two candidates are an equal distance from the median, then the average of the two policies is implemented. For this problem we suppose that both candidates care about both the implemented policy and winning the election. That is, the payo to each candidate has two parts. The first part is the utility from the implemented policy a*. That is, each candidate has utility u(a* ; xi), where xi is the ideal policy of candidate i and utility decreases to the left and right of xi. We suppose that xi < m < xj . The second part is the value of winning office, which we denote wi > 0 for candidate i. Putting these two parts together, we de ne the payoff to candidate i by
Find all Nash equilibria to this game.
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For the section on dynamic games of competition, you can begin by asking if anyone in the class has played competi- tive tennis (club or collegiate or better); there is usually one
Take a news story, old or recent, and analyze it from a game theoretic perspective. Provide a hard copy of the source of your news story and consult relevant game theoretic literat
Discussion in the preceding section suggests that if we want to measure a given hnction belonging to a simultaneous-equations model, the hnction must be fairly stable over the samp
Consider a game in which player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns and player 3 chooses matrices. Only Player 3''s payoffs are given below. Show that D is not a best response
What do meant by Monopolistic competition? Monopolistic competition is a market structure wherein: 1. There are several competing producers into an industry, 2. Every pro
Named when Vilfredo Pareto, Pareto optimality may be alive of potency. An outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there's no different outcome that produces each player a minimum of
A type of sequential second worth auction, just like an English auction during which an auctioneer frequently raises the present worth. Participants should signal at each worth lev
How did link die
Problem:-Two players take turns choosing a number between 1 and 10 (inclusive), and a cumulative total of their choices is kept. The player to take the total exactly to 100 is the
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