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Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution of voters with median m and the candidate whose policy is closest to the median wins the election and the winning candidate's policy is implemented. If the two candidates are an equal distance from the median, then the average of the two policies is implemented. For this problem we suppose that both candidates care about both the implemented policy and winning the election. That is, the payo to each candidate has two parts. The first part is the utility from the implemented policy a*. That is, each candidate has utility u(a* ; xi), where xi is the ideal policy of candidate i and utility decreases to the left and right of xi. We suppose that xi < m < xj . The second part is the value of winning office, which we denote wi > 0 for candidate i. Putting these two parts together, we de ne the payoff to candidate i by
Find all Nash equilibria to this game.
A type of trigger strategy sometimes applied to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma during which a player responds in one amount with identical action her opponent utilized in the last
A bidding increment is defined by the auctioneer as the least amount above the previous bid that a new bid must be in order to be adequate to the auctioneer. For example, if the in
In any game, utility represents the motivations of players. A utility perform for a given player assigns variety for each potential outcome of the sport with the property that a be
In a repeated game it is often unspecified that players move concurrently at predefined time intervals. However, if few players update their policies at different time intervals, t
please compute this number 885 for the swertres lotto game.
A market mechanism in which a service, objects, or set of objects, is swapped on the basis of bids submitted by member. Auctions offer a precise set of rules that will rule the pur
Consider two identical firms, for each firm, the total cost of producing q units of output is C(q)=0.5q^2. The price is determined as P(q1,q2)- a-q1-q2. Estimate Cournots outcome;
1. Two firms, producing an identical good, engage in price competition. The cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) = 1:17y 1 and c 2 (y 2 ) = 1:19y 2 , correspondingly. The demand functi
How do I eliminate weakly dominated strategy
A non-cooperative game is one during which players are unable to form enforceable contracts outside of these specifically modeled within the game. Hence, it's not outlined as games
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