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Description
The simplest of William Poundstone's social dilemmas during which the every player contains a dominant strategy and also the equilibrium is Pareto optimal. the sole factor qualifying it as a social dilemma is that the arbitrary assignment of labels to the methods. just like the Prisoner's Dilemma, every player hopes for the opposite to cooperate, however neither will. However, not like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the ensuing equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Example
Player 2
cooperate
defect
Player 1
1,1
0,3
3,0
2,2
General Form
L
R
U
a,w
b,x
D
c,y
d,z
Where the following relations hold: c>d>a>b x>z>w>y
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