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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
Two individuals use a common resource (a river or a forest, for example) to produce output. The more the resource is used, the less output any given individual can produce. Denote
Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is worth v to each animal. The cost of fighting is c1 for the first animal (player 1) and c2 for the second animal (player 2). If the
Nineteenth century French economist attributed with the introduction of the theory of profit maximizing producers. In his masterpiece, The Recherches, published in 1838, Cournot pr
A set of colluding bidders. Ring participants agree to rig bids by agreeing not to bid against each other, either by avoiding the auction or by placing phony (phantom) bids.
An item of information of data in a very game is common grasp ledge if all of the players realize it (it is mutual grasp ledge) and every one of the players grasp that each one dif
Another term for a preserved bid auction in which bidders simultaneously submit bids to the auctioneer with no knowledge of the amount bid by other member. Usually, the uppermost b
Rules of Snake Eyes (small variation on game called Craps in USA) Player rolls two dice. On the first roll if the total of the dice is 2 (snake eyes): player wins and rece
This chapter introduces mixed strategies and the methods used to solve for mixed strategy equilibria. Students are likely to accept the idea of randomization more readily if they t
The notion that those that don't contribute to some project might nevertheless get pleasure from it (free riders), evidenced in games like the tragedy of the commons and public pro
Exercise 1 a) Pure strategy nash equilibrium in this case is Not Buy, bad ( 0,0) as no one wants to deviate from this strategy. b) The player chooses buy in the first perio
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