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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
Consider two quantity-setting firms that produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function for the good is p = A - (q 1 +q 2 ). Both firms have a cost function C = q 2 (a
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Three flowcharts and the game board for your mousetrap game should be submitted. You can use board_design.pdf to help you lay out your board. Basically, you can use any shapes you
In a positive add game, the combined payoffs of all players aren't identical in each outcome of the sport. This differs from constant add (or zero add) games during which all outco
I have a problem with an exercise about Cournot game. It is very complex and it is composed by different question and it is impossible for me to write the complete text. I need som
To give Mom a day of rest, Dad Plans to take his two children, Bart and Cassie, on an outing on Sunday.Bart prefers to go to the amusement park (A), Whereas Cassie prefers to go to
What are the important forms of product differentiation? There are three significant forms of product differentiation, which are: 1. Differentiation through style or type –
Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is worth v to each animal. The cost of fighting is c1 for the first animal (player 1) and c2 for the second animal (player 2). If the
Discussion in the preceding section suggests that if we want to measure a given hnction belonging to a simultaneous-equations model, the hnction must be fairly stable over the samp
A mixed strategy during which the player assigns strictly positive chance to each pure strategy.Morgenstern, Oskar,Coauthor of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior with John von N
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