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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
GAME 2 The Tire Story Another game that we have successfully played in the first lecture is based on the “We can’t take the exam; we had a flat tire”. Even if the students hav
Any participant in a very game who (i) contains a nontrivial set of methods (more than one) and (ii) Selects among the methods primarily based on payoffs. If a player is non
You and an opponent are seated at a table, and on the table is a square board. At each of the four corners of the board, there is a disc, each one red on one side and black on the
The most basic version of a LIV allows the executive office holder (Governor or President) to accept part of a bill passed by the legislature (so that part becomes law) and to veto
Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution
GAME Adding Numbers—Lose If Go to 100 or Over (Win at 99) In the second ver- sion, two players again take turns choosing a number be- tween 1 and 10 (inclusive), and a cumulati
Games with Sequential Moves Most students find the idea of rollback very simple and natural, even without drawing or understanding trees. Of course, they start by being able to
James and Dean are playing the Chicken game. They have noticed that their payout for being perceived as "tough" depends on the size of the crowd. The larger the crowd, the "cooler"
Named when Vilfredo Pareto, Pareto optimality may be alive of potency. An outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there's no different outcome that produces each player a minimum of
(a) Equilibrium payoffs are (1, 0). Player A’s equilibrium strategy is S; B’s equilibrium strategy is “t if N.” For (a): Player A has two strategies: (1) N or (2) S. P
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