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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose the quantities they will sell in the market, q1 and q2. The price each receives for each unity
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A strategy is weakly dominant if, no matter what the other players do, the strategy earns a player a payoff a minimum of as high as the other strategy, and, the strategy earns a st
An item of information of data in a very game is common grasp ledge if all of the players realize it (it is mutual grasp ledge) and every one of the players grasp that each one dif
A collection of colluding bidders. Ring members comply with rig bids by agreeing to not bid against one another, either by avoiding the auction or by putting phony (phantom) bids
Borel was maybe the primary to outline the notion of games of strategy. He printed many papers on poker, incorporating themes of imperfect data and credibility. Whereas his writing
1. Two firms, producing an identical good, engage in price competition. The cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) = 1:17y 1 and c 2 (y 2 ) = 1:19y 2 , correspondingly. The demand functi
if the first three words are "the boy''s down" what are the last three words?
An auction during which many (more than one) things are offered for sale. Mechanisms for allocating multiple units embody discriminatory and uniform worth auctions.
I have a problem with an exercise about Cournot game. It is very complex and it is composed by different question and it is impossible for me to write the complete text. I need som
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