Bayesian Cournot, Game Theory

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Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose the quantities they will sell in the market, q1 and q2. The price each receives for each unity given these quantities is P (q1, q2) = a - b(q1 + q2). Suppose that each firm has probability µ of havingunitcostsofcL and(1-µ)ofhavingunitcostsofcH,wherecH >cL. Solveforthe Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

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