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A sub game excellent Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium such that players' methods represent a Nash equilibrium in each sub game of the initial game. it should be found by backward induction, an iterative method for solving finite in depth kind or sequential games. First, one determines the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the sport. Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last moving player is decided taking the last player's action as given. the method continues during this manner backwards in time till all players' actions are determined.
Sub game excellent equilibria eliminate no credible threats.
A multiunit auction mechanism for assigning heterogeneous (different) objects. The highest bidder in the first round selects one item among those offered for sale. Then, a second r
In a repeated game it is often unspecified that players move concurrently at predefined time intervals. However, if few players update their policies at different time intervals, t
In a positive add game, the combined payoffs of all players aren't identical in each outcome of the sport. This differs from constant add (or zero add) games during which all outco
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Perfect Nash equilibrium Two students prepare their homework assignment together for a course. They both enjoy getting high grade for their assignment, but they dislike workin
Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N
Combining Simultaneous and Sequential Moves The material in this chapter covers a variety of issues that require some knowledge of the analysis of both sequential- move
A non-credible threat may be a threat created by a player in a very Sequential Game which might not be within the best interest for the player to hold out. The hope is that the thr
Equilibrium payoffs are (4, 5). Player A’s equilibrium strategy is “S then S if n and then N if n again.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “n if S and then n if S again and then
Eighteenth century Dutch mathematician codified the notion of expected utility as a revolutionary approach to risk. He noted that folks don't maximize expected returns however expe
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