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Discussion
Why would a leader receive the results of a quantitative analysis (as from a break-even analysis model) and decide against what the results indicate? Give examples of qualitative factors that may guide a leader to deciding to do something other than what a qualitative analysis suggests should be done.
Find the core of the variant of the horse trading game in which there is a single owner, whose valuation is less than the highest valuation of the non owners.
Compute the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria for the following games. - Do so by writing the normal-form matrices for each game and its subgames.
Write a program in c that takes n number finite players using gambit format and output is to be all pure strategy nash equilibrium
a supplier and a buyer who are both risk neutral play the following game the buyer orders a good of quality q ge0 from
Assume you are one of two manufactures of tennis balls. Both you and your competitor have zero marginal costs. Total demand for tennis balls is
Assume that there are 10 pencils available of each color, and different children are allowed to choose the same color.
If each group had 15 officers, how would you characterize the performance of the typical officer in each squad?
the seller of durable goods whom we have met before.this time he is selling to three potential consumers h m l remember
Find the set of Nash equilibria of this game.- Prove that the set of correlated equilibria of this game is the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria.
Suppose your friend is creating a game about Lewis and Clark's expedition. Provide a list of 10 possible elements she should include in the game in order to make it as informative and exciting as possible
Prove that in a symmetric sealed-bid second-price auction with independent private values the only monotonically increasing, symmetric equilibrium is the equilibrium in which every buyer submits a bid equal to his private value.
The enclosed Java code was suppose to address the following problem, where I require in giving comments/criticism/remarks if possible with respect to the Java coding standards.
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