Reference no: EM131675441

Questiopn: PRISCILLA D. WEBSTER v. BLUE SHIP TEA ROOM, INC. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

FACTS: Priscilla Webster, a restaurant patron who ordered seafood chowder and choked on a fi shbone, brought this case. She maintained that she would not have reasonably expected to fi nd a bone in the chowder. As a result of the bone in the chowder, Webster suffered through several hospital procedures to remove the bone, at considerable cost and pain. At the trial, a jury found for Webster. The Blue Ship Tea Room, the defendant, appealed the case on the basis of the legal interpretation of the implied warranty of merchantability. The appellate decision has become a classic in American jurisprudential reasoning.

ISSUE: Does a fi shbone found in fi sh chowder render the chowder inedible, thereby breaching the implied warranty of merchantability?

REASONING: The court, in great detail, discussed the rich culinary history of New England seafood chowders. In going through the details of exactly how good chowder is made, the court praised the richness of thick, plump, delicious pieces of fi sh and shellfi sh. Completely ridding the chowder of any possibility of bones would require the cook to mince the seafood fi nely, depriving the dish of one of its hallmark characteristics. Further, the court argued that anyone eating good New England seafood chowder would know or should know that fi shbones are indeed a possibility.

DECISION AND REMEDY: As lamentable as Webster's injuries were, the court found that the Blue Ship Tea Room had not breached its implied warranty of merchantability.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE: Common sense needs to apply in defi ning "merchantability." Clearly, a piece of bone in a hamburger is unreasonable and would violate the implied warranty. However, in cases when the buyer should expect a problem, such as a possible fi shbone in a seafood dish, the buyer must be prepared to accept the situation.

CRITICAL THINKING: As with most legal decisions, the critical-thinking activity that is most obvious is the need to examine possible analogies the court could use in justifying its conclusion. Consider this analogy: Is the fi shbone in the chowder the same as a shard of beef bone in a beef vegetable soup? What about a piece of chicken bone in a chicken salad sandwich? How about a small caterpillar in a fresh green salad? Would the aptness of the analogy depend at all on the size of the bone in the fi sh chowder?

ETHICAL DECISION MAKING: The judge mainly used assumption of risk to rule against Webster, though she suffered an injury in fact. Should the restaurant have somehow compensated her? What would the WH framework indicate should be done?