Reference no: EM133794195
Assignment: Philosophy
Choose ONE of these prompts-
I. Suppose that in a few decades, our space drones discover animate creatures on the moon Europa. We don't know yet whether these creatures are biological or mechanical, just that they act in sophisticated ways (and are hard to catch). What would it take to make it reasonable to think these creatures have minds or mental states and processes (thoughts, intelligence, feelings)? Note: We're not asking how we could prove they do; maybe this can't be proved even for other human beings. We're just asking when would it be reasonable to count them as having minds too? or are they instead just clever mindless automata (perhaps like ants or household appliances)? What would persuade you they do have minds? What would persuade you they don't? What would persuade you they have minds in some senses but not others? (Explain what are the different senses you're thinking of.)
For this prompt, you will probably find it helpful to revisit our earlier readings and discussion of cognitive abilities in primates, parrots, and other animals. That earlier material can give you "imaginative fuel," even if you don't make use of any specifics from it. It also gives examples of how arguments about a creature having or lacking some mental capacity might reasonably go.
II. Materialists often complain that dualists can't give a satisfactory account of how the physical and the mental causally interact. What are the materialist's strongest reasons for thinking dualists can't do this? In your view, do dualists have any promising replies? If some interactionist form of dualism were true, and souls causally affected what happens in the physical world, would that conflict with entirely physics-based predictions about how the physical world will change (or even, how it will probably change)? Should the dualist be comfortable or embarrassed if their theory makes different predictions than the physicists do?
We discussed several arguments about these issues. If you think some of them are stronger or more effective than others, then focus or confine your attention to them. It's not so helpful or interesting for you to just enumerate arguments we discussed in class, and then not have much more to say, either against them or supporting them further.
In answering this prompt, one issue you might take up (but you don't need to, if it doesn't naturally fit what else you address) is whether an "epiphenomenalist" form of dualism would be as vulnerable to the arguments you discuss as are the dualists who think mental states do have physical effects.
III. In class and web notes we mentioned some different ways that philosophers have proposed your "access to," or knowledge about, your own mind is "special" and better than your access to your physical environment and to other people's minds. Spell out in more detail some proposal of this sort. (It needn't be exactly what anybody has really said, nor need you identify people who have said it. You just need to explain, as carefully as you can and using examples, a way in which one might plausibly think that your access to your own mind is special/better.) Formulate a challenge to this proposal: that is, describe a case that certain of your mental states aren't accessible in the way you described. Your initial proposal should have some plausibility, even if in the end you think you don't have that kind of access to many/any of your mental states. The challenge you raise should also have some plausibility, even if you think it's ultimately wrong and can be rebutted. You're allowed to come down on either side. We just want to hear you set up the debate, and explain the most compelling reasons for each side.