Reference no: EM132285567

The Pioneer Square Plaintiffs filed an action in King County Superior Court on June 25, 2003, seeking redress for the injuries they suffered during the Mardi Gras celebration on Tuesday, February 27, 2001.   In their state court complaint, they alleged three causes of actions:  (1) a claim pursuant to § 1983, (2) a state law outrage claim, and (3) a state law negligence cause of action.   On July 29, 2003, the case was removed by the Defendants to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. In federal court, the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, in which they asserted the same § 1983 claim and two state law tort causes of action.   On February 2, 2004, the Defendants moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   On June 8, 2004, the district court granted the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the state law outrage claim.2  It denied the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, and ordered supplemental briefing regarding the state law negligence cause of action.   On June 22, 2004, the district court denied the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the state law negligence cause of action.   Subsequently, on December 9, 2004, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and the state law negligence cause of action.   On March 16, 2005, the district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. This timely appeal followed. III The Pioneer Square Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in concluding that the Defendants are not liable.   Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), they argue that the policy employed by the Seattle Police Department over a period of years to control large crowd disturbances was substandard and resulted in a deprivation of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in personal security. Alternatively, the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are liable for enhancing their danger and proximately causing their injuries by abandoning the operational plan for crowd control, adopted on Sunday, February 5, 2005, that called for a large, highly visible police presence and aggressive law enforcement, and, instead, implementing a more passive plan of staying on the perimeter of the crowd in Pioneer Square. “We review de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment.”  Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir.2005).   “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”   Id. (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc)).   The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts · the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith RadioCorp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).

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