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ABC is currently in a swap contract. As part of the contract, ABC will sell 108 units of Corn 2 months from now at a price of $3.06 per unit, and sell 330 units of Corn 11 months from now at a price of $1.67 per unit. The yearly CCIR is 1.64.
Suppose that the spot price of corn is $8.60 and $5.87 at the time of the two deliveries.
What is the PV of the payoff from the Swap?
Margin of error here: +/- 2%
Find a babbling perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. - What is the most informative perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game?
Given that case c holds, write a formula for Row's probability of choos ing Up. Call this proba bility p, and write it as a function of A, B, and C.
While grading in a final exam, an economics professor found that two students have virtually identical answers. She is convinced two cheated but cannot prove it.
Write down the payoff table for this game, and find the equilibrium when the two firms move simultaneously. Write down the game tree for this game, with Coke moving first and Pepsi following.
Check that no coalition can improve upon any action of the grand coalition in which the output received by every worker is nonnegative and at most f(n) - f(n - 1).
Verify that these strategies form a Nash equilibrium of the game. Do this by describing the payoffs players would get from deviating.
Q: Critique the following research done in a service industry as to the extent to which it meets the hallmarks of scientific investigation discussed in this cha
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Compute the number of pure strategies a player has in a T -stage game with n players, where the number of actions of each player i in the base game is |Si| = ki.
Prove that if a player in an extensive-form game has only one information set, then his set of mixed strategies equals his set of behavior strategies.
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