What is the one-period nash equilibrium market price

Assignment Help Econometrics

Reference no: EM13233046

Once again, assume Cournot competition in an industry in which market demand is described by:
P = 260 - 2Q and in which each firm has a marginal cost of 20. However, instead of two firms, let there now be four.

a. What is the one-period Nash equilibrium market price? What is the output and profit of each firm in this equilibrium?

b. What is the output of each firm if they collude to produce the monopoly output? What profit does each firm earn with such collusion?

Reference no: EM13233046

Questions Cloud

What is the output of this code sequence : What is the output of this code sequence

What is the nash equilibrium if the game is only played once : An industry consists of two firms with identical costs C(q) = 5q +q2=2. The firms can either collude or compete. If both collude, they each produce qm (half the monopoly output Qm). If one rm colludes and the other competes

Explain how many milligrams of sample remains : The half-life of cobalt-60 is 5.20 yr. How many milligrams of a 1.000-mg sample remains after 3.50 years?

What is the output of this code sequence : What is the output of this code sequence?

What is the one-period nash equilibrium market price : Once again, assume Cournot competition in an industry in which market demand is described by P = 260 - 2Q and in which each firm has a marginal cost of 20. However, instead of two firms, let there now be four.

Explain the elodea and onion cells : How do the size and shape of a human epithelial cells differfrom those of the Elodea and onion cells, Why do Elodea and onion cells have more consistent shapes than human epithelial cells

What is the output of this code sequence : What is the output of this code sequence?

Explain the sn1 and sn2 mechanisms : Can someone describe what the sn1 and sn2 mechanisms are and the primary factors that effect why alkyl halides undergo one pathway over the other.

How much will the profit of the cheating firm be : Return again to the cartel in Problems 4 and 5. Now suppose that the market game repeated indefinitely. What is the discount factor (sigma) is necessary now in order to maintain the collusive agreement in an indenitely repeated setting

User Account

All Pages