Reference no: EM132688247
Question (1) What is the classical account of knowledge?
Question (2) What are Gettier-style counterexamples, and how do they challenge the classical account of knowledge?
Question (3) What, if anything, is wrong with defining knowledge as justified true belief that is based on no false assumptions?
Question (4) Is knowledge instrumentally valuable? If so, why, and to what extent?
Question (5) Is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief?
Question (6) What is the radical sceptical argument, and how does it trade on (i) sceptical hypotheses, and (ii) the closure principle?
Question (7) Can one coherently deny the closure principle?
Question (8) Is it possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses?
Question (9) Is ‘knows' a context-sensitive term? If so, does this have any bearing on radical scepticism?