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Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by both parties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probability of winning the trial.
Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by eD>(eD + eP), where eD is the expenditure on evidence production by the defendant and eP is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that eD and eP are greater than or equal to 0. The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if he is found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she loses the case.
(a) Represent this game in normal form.
(b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function for each player.
(c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that the defendant wins in equilibrium.
(d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?
the following game matrix shows the strategies and payoffs to sony and philips as they choose what connection
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Carleton Chemical claims that they can produce more than 800 tons of meladone on average per week. A random sample of 36 weeks of production yields the following results.
Suppose the neighbors choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. Derive the best response functions. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. For the rest of the questions, assume that a1 = a2 = 1. Calculate the payoff..
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