Reference no: EM132739270 , Length: 2500 Words

REFLECTIVE PRACTICE ASSIGNMENT - CASE STUDIES

Case study report

Case 1 - No Good Estimate, No Job!

"We develop perfect quality software" was an informal motto of Software Guru Group (SGG), a unit of a privately held company. Its clients, divisions of the same company, agreed to the very motto. SGG was doing a great job of developing software applications that had almost no bugs. Happy with the quality, the clients did not care much about the actual costs of the projects. For a project to be approved and paid for by the client, SGG would simply submit an order-of-magnitude estimate (a rough estimate) ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 resource hours and that was it. Then, a project would be easily approved and selected. Nevertheless, no one would know the exact cost of any project since the estimate was done based on an educational guess.

Then, the company went public and the trend of profit orientation and demonstrated cost efficiency took over. Unable to respond to the trends, all division managers were forced out and new, profit- oriented division executives were brought in. The change impacted the company in many ways. The game of cost estimating also changed. Now SP Group was requested to have better and more accurate cost estimates of its projects, and to provide proofs of such estimates.

WHAT ABOUT THE SGG?
The new client project managers flatly refused to even look at the order-of-magnitude estimates. Having profit-and-loss responsibility, these project managers wanted to manage their cost and required detailed estimates to approve a project. Lacking the expertise to develop such estimates, a large group of SGG project managers were also forced out. Apparently, the time to learn how to develop a detailed estimate has arrived!

Questions
1. What are available estimation techniques? Define, compare and contrast at least four different methods including bottom-up estimate - 300 words.
2. When should the bottom-up estimate be used? What project documents are required for an effective bottom-up estimation ? Discuss - 300 words.

3. What factors impact the quality of a bottom-up estimate? Discuss at least four factors - 300 words.

Case 2 - Risk Policies in Project Russia
This case study reviews some of the major risk management tactics used in a typical war project - Napoleon's war with Russia in 1812. The war outcome had a stunning end and caused turbulent ramifications for the European map. A lot of ink was poured to explain the destruction of Napoleon' s forces, known as the Grand Army, and experts only agreed on the fact that the Russian winter had a major impact on the war outcome. In the study, we take a risk view of the war conflict.

MISERY AND DEATH WAITED THE GRAND ARMY
For Napoleon, many dilemmas stayed unresolved even after entering Russia. He looked amazed by the glory awaiting conquerors of Russia but at the same time he was painfully aware that he might make the same error Charles XII, Swedish military genius, committed one century earlier - attacking the Russians in the winter. Listen to what Count de Segur, who was with him in Russia, has to say about that.

"The last days of July and the first ones of August in 1812 were stiflingly hot in Vitebsk. In the old city palace Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French, prowled restlessly from room to room in his undergarments. His mind, brilliant author of 12 years of triumphs and 20 famous victories, was torn between prudent counsel to encamp now against the coming winter and bold counsel to march straight on to Moscow. So, he paced . . . in this state of perplexity he spoke a few disconnected words
. . . ‘Well, what are we going to do?' ‘Shall we stay here?' ‘Shall we advance?' ‘How can we stop on the road to glory?'

For 15 torrid days, Napoleon groaned under the weight of his thoughts. By night he tossed his coat, arising frequently from his biography of Charles XII - he would never . . . He shouted, ‘I'll never repeat the folly of Charles.' Instead of the glory, misery and death were awaiting the Grand Army by the time it exited the "sacred soil of Russia" , as the Russians had the habit of saying in Kovno, December 13, 1812. Segur was a witness: "Instead of the four hundred thousand soldiers who fought so many successful battles with them, who had rushed so valiantly into Russia, they saw issuing from the white,

ice-bound desert only one thousand soldiers and troopers still armed and twenty thousand being clothed in rags, with bowed head, dull eyes, ashy, cadaverous faces, and long ice - stiffened beards ... And, this was the Grand Army!" So, 380,000 soldiers of the Grand Army perished. How was this possible? Do the risk planning practices of Napoleon have anything to do with this? Let's review major events and practices in turn.

BACKGROUND
The underlying cause of almost each war tends to be of an economic nature. This war, in Europe from the beginning of the 19th century, is no exception. The three strategic players to the conflict are the great powers of England, France, and Russia. France and England are major rivals and contenders for the central place in Europe. One more power is involved - Russia. The main hero of this conflict who was heavily favored to win this war was France. How was the strategic triangle formed?

The French wanted to execute their economic blockade of England, reduce their goods from European markets, and thus stifle the economy of the country. The French threatened to attack any country that would violate the blockade. Candidates for such a violation risked war with Napoleon's Grand Army, the most famous army of its time.

To beat Russia was a big feat for each army; a trophy for every general. Napoleon had already defeated all armies he could dream of. But nobody had beat Russia! To be truthful, many had famous warriors had tried but the Russian winter proved to be an invincible opponent and a major ally of Russia. Some lived to send the message about what they learned to potential invaders. Swedish King Charles XII, known as Charles the Madman, the warrior with the pedigree, in 1709 attacked Russia in the winter, lost the whole army, and proclaimed in writing: Don 't attack Russia in the winter! But future invaders did not listen.

Napoleon saw Russia as a great trophy. Yes, alleged Russian violation of the blockade was used for the proxy cause of his attack, but this had not been proven. Some rumors circulated that said that Napoleon, the second most successful general of all time (Alexander the Great was considered the first), dreamed of overtaking Alexander the Great, and becoming number 1. Possible, but such were ambitions of Napoleon, who was often called the Anti - Christ and the tormentor of Europe. In truth, the Grand Army was made up of all European nations. There were, for example, 79,000 Bavarian, Italian, and French soldiers and 34,000 Austrian soldiers. The Grand Army was a microcosm of European armies. But they did not volunteer in the army; they had to serve because their country was subdued by France. In case of Napoleon's serious defeat, his army could face the rebellion of the foreign soldiers which meant that war carried the potential for freeing Europe from the domination of Napoleon.

Lastly, winds of bourgeois revolution were felt throughout Europe. Napoleon's expectations were that Russian farmers would accept their own revolution and that they would take his side. He was incorrect, although he hoped to export the revolution and expand its ideas.

IT STARTED LONG BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN
Paris balls and parties as social gatherings were very much appreciated and among the best of their kind in Europe. The winter balls were especially good. People who typically frequented the balls were nobility and the politically elite. If you had gone to a classy Paris ball you would have had a chance to see some very well - known and powerful people. There was a hierarchy of balls, that depended on the power of or historic strength (tradition) of the host(ess) or the list of invitees. The higher those were, the higher significance of the ball. If Napoleon was in attendance, the ball would be of the first level of hierarchy. Such are the reasons that balls and parties of a higher rank were used to host the people with high intelligence knowledge, and so were automatically suitable for gathering intelligence data.
People of Russian nobility and the politically elite used to be frequent guests of these balls and parties. And they fit very well. Be reminded that that the higher class in Russia had spoken French as a first language. So, Russians felt at home in Paris. As people with strong social capital they liked to mingle with the French crowd of high social standing and were constantly invited to the balls.

Napoleon liked to frequent the balls. He had a specific question for the high military visitors from Russia who were there: "What would you do if you commandeered the Russian Army and I attacked you (with the Grand Army)?" Different visitors gave him different answers, often made up. But some replied extremely truthfully like general Beniggsen, who happened to be the commanding officer of the Russian army at the time of Napoleon's attack. He was asked by Napoleon and his answer was exactly what he would do a few years later: "I would never fight your army back, it is too strong; I would retreat and retreat, waiting for the winter to finish you." It is not clear how Napoleon processed this information nor whether he believed it. But it is a fact that Napoleon had a sparrow in his hand, whether consciously knowing it or not.

LESSONS OF THE PAST
During the times of Charles XII, one of the greatest secrets was the size of the population of Sweden. Why? The King did not want anyone outside the country to know just how many people lived in his country who were available to fight in a war. That number would actually show a small country that does not have the population that supports its war policies. Despite a ferocious reputation, Swedish soldiers, whose ancestors the Vikings also enjoyed standing of exceptional fighters, would be defeated more frequently should their enemies know how many Swedish opponents they faced in the long term.

In the beginning of the 18th century, Charles found himself in the long war with Peter the Great, the Russian tsar. Charles dominated the Baltics, where Peter wanted to build the Russian fleet which would become the influential force. After several smaller victories of Charles' army, the major battle took place in 1709 near the river Poltava. Charles' army was not only defeated but it was destroyed. The ruler Charles managed to flee southward to Russian archnemesis Turkey. He published a book (actually his aid authored the book) whose major message to future invaders of Russia was very simple: "Don't attack Russia in the winter "

Napoleon not only read the book carefully but liked to be seen reading it over and over. He tried to serve as an example to his generals and made sure they read the book and understood the experiences of Charles. In fact, the book had immeasurable value for the Grand Army. In terms of risk planning processes, Napoleon used the book in a proper way, at least initially.

RUSSIAN WINTER
In a simplified manner, first, judging by the campaigns before Russia, e.g., Egypt, as usual, Napoleon did not have but the slightest of sketches about how to direct the war against Russia. Troops were told that Napoleon was burning from desire to have the decisive battle against Russians as soon as possible, defeat them, and make them surrender. Over! And all of that was to happen before the infamous Russian winter came. The Russian strategy was diametrically opposed. Exactly like general Beniggsen - German by origin at the time of the vision - the commander of the Russian army predicted they would retreat, retreat, and retreat (surprisingly Segur observed that "there was more order in their victory than in our victory. " ) and told his troops to avoid a decisive battle as much as possible, and wait for the Russian winter to come and help finish off French forces. Well, two strategies look very mutually exclusive, if one happens, that one excludes the other. Let's see how the two strategies unfolded in several risk events.

On June 20, 1812, unknown to the Russians, the multinational Grand Army entered Russian territory. To their surprise they were able to set foot on Russian soil without meeting with any resistance. They found peace there: they had left war on their side. However, a single Russian officer commanding a night patrol soon appeared. He asked the intruders who they were. ‘Frenchmen," they told him. ‘What do you want?' he questioned further. ‘And why have you come to Russia?' One of the sappers answered bluntly, ‘To make war on you!' While a stealthy entry was favorable to the Grand Army from the aspect of having the opposing army surrender, it was not so. Namely, for an army to surrender, it has to be formed, which the Russian Army was not.

The battle of Borodino lasted one day and was the only battle in the war of greater interest but was not the decisive battle. That occurred on September 7, 1812, 79 days after entry of the Grand Army into Russia. The battle had an enormous number of casualties - 43 generals of the Grand Army were wounded or killed; 20,000 killed or wounded troops - but failed to produce a clear winner, although

the Russians went back to their retreating strategy and disappeared for a time. In strategy terms, Napoleon's officers believed that their army made a big mistake, not keeping in contact, chasing the opponent and trying to destroy them. Instead, they regrouped allowing the Russians to take off. So, Napoleon had a chance to finish the war early enough to avoid the trouble of winter. Apparently, Napoleon had no great desire to accelerate his army and force a decisive battle. So, the Russians continued to buy time and kept waiting for winter to do its job, increasing Napoleon's war risk.

Napoleon entered a burned and deserted Moscow on September 14, 1812. The Russians destroyed the city in order to prevent the Grand Army from using Moscow supplies. At this season of the year, Russia is fully aware of his advantage. From there they continued to negotiate the Russian surrender who did not intend to surrender but again, buy time. As Segur says, "Thu far Napoleon had conquered only space " The retreating Russian armies were in front of him and Moscow was but 20 days away.

In a situation, when every date meant a lot for survival of the Grand Army, the Russians outsmarted Napoleon and opened the possibility of winning the war. Again, Napoleon did not show a willingness to change strategy and catch the Russians, thus reducing their risk. Amazing was the French lack of attention to details and no contingency plan.

RISK TREATMENT
It is interesting to observe how the best of the best, for instance, the Grand Army, follow the normal risk policy which, in this case, would be among one of the widely accepted policies such as PMBOK's. It has six processes: risk management planning, risk identification, qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning, and risk monitoring and control.

Grand parties and balls, as a place for top intelligence, probably covered the processes of risk management planning and risk identification, more so than, say, qualitative risk analysis. There were no indications that risk events like a retreating strategy and the Russian winter were subjected to risk analysis, risk response planning, or risk monitoring and control. No details in Segur's book hint to a mitigation or adaptation of the military strategy to account for Russian continuous retreating as a valid military strategy. Hence, at best, the French heard about Russian intentions in terms of a Russian approach but did not take the action to prevent that or learn to move the soldiers faster.

As for the writings of Charles XII, they had significant influence among the top officers of the Grand Army. How significant? He did some sort of risk management planning and identified risks such as those offered in the book and he assessed risks qualitatively by describing the heavy impact of the season. However, we don't see that Napoleon did any risk analysis, let alone response planning or taking any risk monitoring and control steps. Napoleon didn't make any adaptation in his military strategy to not be facing the Russians during winter. Nor did he quit after studying the message of Charles to not attack Russians during winter. If we take Napoleon's approach as insufficient, we

conclude that he didn't really listen to Charles' advice. Probably, he saw the quality of his Grand Army as incomparably higher than the one of the Swedish. The fact is, then, that the analysts considered the French advantage to be a better army, but the Russians had familiarity of terrain and climate. Maybe Napoleon was right, maybe not, in leading his solders to death.

Speaking of the Borodino, the battle there had enormous importance. Technically viewed, it is not known whether any steps in a risk analysis were even considered. This means that risk management planning, risk identification, qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning, and risk monitoring and control were not considered relevant. But wait a minute, Napoleon's decision at Borodino to allow the Russians to run away made some of his generals angry and some spoke of treason. Maybe French nationalism played a role, or maybe Napoleon thought there had to be one more battle to settle the account, but the mistake to let the Russians go and not make it the central piece of their risk strategy were blunders.

The French didn't have the luxury of seeing such a chance again. The importance of an empty and burned Moscow, aside from public relations, had one more cause of importance. This was a time for diplomatic moves, to have a Russian surrender. Napoleon thought that the Russians did not want to surrender but only pretended to. He believed, and some French generals as well, that at this point Russians had the advantage. "Napoleon entered Moscow with only 90,000 troops." Russians played this negotiation game, just for one reason - to buy time and prolong the French stay on Russian soil until the winter would finish them off. In such conditions, PMBOK's six risk policies did not have their usual significance. More accurately, the French ship had already sunk enough by then, and it was time for the Russians to secure the win.

Questions
4. Identify four major risk events, perform risk analysis for each, and develop risk response plans. Discuss the risks and responses - 300 words.

5. In your opinion, how did Napoleon control each of the major risk events on your list? Discuss using relevant risk management theory - 300 words.

6. Do you think the way in which Napoleon controlled risks related influenced the war outcome? Discuss using risk management theory - 300 words.

Attachment:- Case study report.rar