Reference no: EM133636908
The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters
We discussed the 2003 Columbia shuttle disaster in chapter 3. There, we explored reasons why organizations (in this case NASA) often fail to change following accidents such as this one, having previously lost the shuttle Challenger in 1986. We also explored the organizational culture at NASA in chapter 5, emphasizing that, while the blame for both shuttle losses was linked to technical problems, the more significant contributory factors lay with leadership, management, and organizational culture issues. This is a familiar pattern, seen in many major catastrophes. Here is a fuller account of both disasters, which contain lessons concerning organizational change in general and the sustainability of change in particular. Space exploration is unique in many respects, but from a change management perspective, the lessons from this experience are generic.
As you read this case account, consider the following questions:
What aspects of NASA practice revealed following the Columbia disaster suggest that the changes that were recommended following the Challenger disaster were not sustained?
This chapter has discussed actions that can be taken to sustain change. In your judgment, which of the following would have been most useful to NASA after the Challenger disaster?