Reference no: EM132175317
between 250 and 400 words
SunTzu says that the best strategy is to attack your enemy's strategy. Next best, attack his alliances. Then, if necessary, attack his army, and his least preferred attack his cities.
Clausewitz lists attack his army as number one, then take capital, etc, etc
It is obvious that SunTzu sees non-violent means as part as war also, but as you can see that to Clausewitz war means fighting. SunTzu sees if the enemy's plans can be disrupted, or if his alliances can be corrupted, then one can win without fighting. Carl clearly sees that war requires bloodshed, fighting.
Carl clearly states that Sunny's first two preferences are useful, but depending upon them too much can be dangerous, especially if your enemy is intent on fighting. Carl would say that Sunny's first two strategies aren't war, war is bloodshed and that war unleashes passions and danger unlike any other human activity.
I think another big difference is how they view intelligence and deception. SunTzu puts great stock in intelligence, Carl is very skeptical. SunTzu may be guilty of believing his side is all seeing, while the enemy is dull and stupid. Clausewitz mostly sees deception as a waste of time and resources, Sunny "all warfare depends on deception." We can see quite a divide there.
Now onto the war termination quote. When I first thought about this quote, I thought Clausewitz had it all wrong. Then I realized the quote was another "ideal type," the way it ought to be. When it becomes clear that the value of the object is no longer worth the cost to achieve, "renounce" the object and peace will follow.
That's not how it works in the real world. How does one quantify the value of the object precisely? How does one predict future effort to achieve object? Obviously, there had been a miscalculation that got your side into this position in the first place, why would your future calculations prove any more accurate?
Additionally, how does a political leader admit "it was all a bad idea" and declare the effort no longer worth pursuing, and hope to stay in power?
What about sunk costs? What about all those lives and treasure lost in pursuit of an object that proved unachievable at acceptable costs?
What about the enemy? What if he notes weakness on your behalf and thus raises his demands to make peace? What if his demands are too high for you to accept? Is your side going to "unconditionally surrender" to end the war? Make a unilateral peace?
The point of this quote was to demonstrate that there are limits to rationality in the process of war termination. This is especially true in wars for limited objectives. You will see this dilemma face the British in the American Revolution, and the Russo-Japanese War.