Reference no: EM1311942
Q. Second-price sealed-bid auction. There are 20 bidders. Every bidder i values the object at vi > 0. The indices are chosen in a way so that v1 > v2 > ... > v20 > 0.
Every bidder i can submit a bid bi ≥ 0. Bidder whose bid is highest wins object. If there are multiple highest bids, then the winner is the bidder whose valuation is the highest (or whose index is the smallest) among the highest bidders (for example, if bidder 1 also bidder 2 have the highest bid, then bidder 1 is the winner).
The winner, say bidder i, gets a payoff vi - p, where p is the second highest bid (it equals the highest bid if there are multiple highest bids). Losing players receive zero payoffs.
a. Elucidate how that (b1, ..., b20) = (v1, ..., v20), i.e. every player bidding her valuation, is a Nash equilibrium.
b. Find out Nash equilibrium in that player 10 wins object. Explicate your answer.
c. (more difficult) Find all Nash equilibria in which player 9 wins the object.