Reference no: EM13701015

Considered the following market. Chrome can choose when launching its new product either to do it LARGE or as NICHE. After Chrome has chosen its action, Firefox observes Chrome's choice and then can choose to ADAPT to RETAIN its own product. After Firefox has chosen its action, the game ends and the payoffs are made. The payoffs are as follows. If Chrome chooses LARGE and Firefox ADAPT, the payoffs are 25 and 40 to Chrome and Firefox, respectively. If Chrome goes LARGE and Firefox RETAINS the payoffs are 30 and 50 to Chrome and Firefox. If Chrome plays NICHE and Firefox ADAPTS, the payoffs are (40 Chrome, 30 Firefox) and if Chrome plays NICHE and Firefox RETAINS the payoffs are (20, 20) for Chrome and Firefox, respectively.

Q: Does the subgame perfect equilibrium equilibrium result in the outcome that maximises total surplus? If it is, explain why. If not, is there any way the surplus- maximising outcome can be obtained? Interpret your answer in the context of the Coase Theorem. Why might your solution not work?
2.Two workers (workers 1 and 2) on a production line both have the choice to come to work Late or Early. If both come Late their payoffs are 5 and 4 to worker 1 and 2, respectively. If worker 1 comes Late and worker 2 comes Early the payoffs are 2 to each worker. If worker 1 comes Early and 2 comes Late the payoffs are 1 to each of them. Finally, if both workers come Early the payoffs are 3 to each worker.
Q:Draw the normal form of this game and determine all of the Nash equilibria. Do you think this game could represent a true production process?