Reference no: EM132281779
Respond with 250 words:
The enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) changed the United States maritime industry. Port facilities and shipping companies were tasked to conduct security assessments and develop comprehensive security plans. Protecting American ports are a priority as they provide economic stability and growth to not only the United States, but the world. The safe movement of cargo is made possible through port facilities and operations, connecting the land with the sea.
There are hundreds of ports across the country serving all modes of maritime shipping, whether it's containers, passengers, petroleum products, or dried goods. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "most ports are characterized by a mixed ownership between private terminal operations and public port authorities" (2016, p. 63).
Although there may be a variety of companies operating at a port, they are leasing the property or terminal, in which the port maintains ownership. Therefore, the port is responsible for creating and implementing a security plan, approved by the U.S. Coast Guard. This plan will identify access control, security, and response measures to a variety of threats, which could include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
If a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) were to be used at a port, the results would be devastating; thousands of lives would be lost and damage and trade losses would cost billions. According to Nincic, "maritime attacks have tended to be fairly small in nature, consisting largely of bombings near port facilities" (2012, para. 2).
Despite the fact that attacks have been "small", it is quite important to note that they have occurred at port facilities, not on ships. With an increase in terrorist activities over the years, and the desire to cause physical and economic harm to the United States, a WMD attack must be taken seriously.
Emergency management plans, including the prevention, preparation, and response to a WMD attack must be detailed. The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) recognizes "the opening of a domestic port or waterway after a natural or human caused disaster is a complex challenge with a wide range of variables and coordination needs" (2015, para. 1).
Due to the power and nature of a WMD attack, it is most likely that areas outside port facilities will be affected, but this discussion will focus on the port area. The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port would be responsible for implementing the Area Maritime Security Plan as required by the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, which would aid in the recovery of the maritime transportation system.
Such safety and emergency management plans would include information on the type of traffic the port typically handles, whether it's commercial, pleasure, fishing, tug, salvage, etc. There should be adequate pollution control, and waste management facilities and vessels capable of responding to and deploying resources.
Hydrographic and survey vessels would be needed to check areas alongside the pier and navigation channels for obstructions, hazards, and water quality. Engineering teams would have to evaluate pier infrastructure and mooring bollard strength to ensure the port would be able to accommodate a ship after damage to port infrastructure. Evacuation routes need to be properly labeled and clear for nonessential personnel to leave and first responders to enter. Adequate personal protective equipment and decontamination areas must be readily available. Port personnel should be certified in safety and security training and participate in drills and industry related meetings.
However, with all of the appropriate resources in place, training, drills, inspections, and audits, the current legislative security policies are not enough. The detection methods and technology needed to identify WMD have not been successfully developed yet. While testifying before a governmental committee, Flynn (2006) describes a likely scenario where a container is manipulated and sabotaged with a dirty bomb, and as it transits through various ports, it is eventually loaded on a container ship at a major port, where the company is part of the Customs-Trade Partnerships Against Terror program.
"Because the dirty bomb is shielded in lead, the radiation portals currently deployed along the U.S-Canadian border do not detect it" (Flynn, 2006, para. 6). Detection and prevention are the first step, but if a WMD cannot even be detected or prevented from entering the country, then what purpose does the current system serve in terms of WMDs?
The United States Customs and Border Protection and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (implemented under SAFE Port Act), were working on a program to develop and test a type of next-generation radiation portal monitor" (USGAO, 2014, p. 14). However, the United States Government Accountability Office found that the "initial testing...was not rigorous enough...and the portals did not perform well enough to warrant deployment" (2014, p. 15).
In addition, continued problems with the Secure Freight Initiative are preventing 100% screening of all containers for WMDs. The Secretary of Homeland Security advised that the "negative effects on trade capacity and the flow of cargo and characteristics of foreign ports prevent the installation of scanning systems - continue to prevail and preclude full-scale implementation" (USGAO, 2014, p. 17). With the above mentioned issues, there are still great concerns over a potential WMD attack.