Reference no: EM133368902

According to Afonso Alburqueque speech to Men of the Portuguese Fleet Before the Second Attack On Melaka answer the following questions

1. Why were Albuquerque's officers and men hesitant to support another attack on Melaka?

2. What does Albuquerque believe to be the overall religious significance of the Portuguese effort to take Melaka?

3. What does Albuquerque believe to be the overall economic significance of taking control of Melaka?

4. Why is Albuquerque confident that the Portuguese effort will succeed?

Following a failed Portuguese effort to take Melaka in 1509, Albuquerque returned in 1511 with a fleet of fourteen ships and approximately eleven hundred men. After the first Portuguese attack on the strongly defended city in late July failed, he deliv- ered the following speech to his officers before a second attack on August 11. His words are recorded in a history of Albuquerque's exploits written by his son, Braz de Albuquerque, around 1515 and published in 1576 as Commentarios do Grande Afonso de Albuquerque. In the following speech, the elder Albuquerque reminds the Portu- guese what is at stake, and in doing so, provides insights into the motives behind the Portuguese imperial enterprise.

Mohammedan sect from spreading any further. I hope in Our Lord1 that, as a result of our doing this, the Muslims may be driven out of India2 alto- gether, because most, if not all, of them live from the trade of this country and so have become pow- erful and rich and the owners of great treasures. I believe that the king of Melaka [Sultan Mahmud Shah] will not attempt to negotiate terms with us in order to safeguard his position. He has once al- ready suffered defeat and experienced our strength and now, after sixteen days have passed, is no longer able to hope that any help will come to him from outside. I also believe that Our Lord will close his mind and harden his heart, because he wants this business of Melaka to be brought to a conclusion so as to open the route through the Straits [of Melaka] to us. The king of Portugal has often commanded me to go to the Straits, because it seemed to His Highness that this was the best place to intercept the trade which the Muslims of Cairo and of Mecca and Jiddah3 carry on in these parts. So it was to do Our Lord's service that we were brought here; by taking Melaka, we would close the Straits so that never again would the Muslims be able to bring their spices by this route.

The other reason I put to you is the great ser- vice that we shall do to King Manuel by taking this city. It is the source of all the spices and drugs that the Muslims ship from here each year to the Straits, without our being able to stop them. If we cut them off from their traditional market, there will be no port or other place in the region as convenient as this that they can use. Since we gained control of the Malabar [southwest Indian] pepper trade, Cairo has not received any except what the Mus- lims have been able to take from this region. Forty or fifty [ships] sail every year from here bound for

Mohammedan sect from spreading any further. I hope in Our Lord1 that, as a result of our doing this, the Muslims may be driven out of India2 alto- gether, because most, if not all, of them live from the trade of this country and so have become pow- erful and rich and the owners of great treasures. I believe that the king of Melaka [Sultan Mahmud Shah] will not attempt to negotiate terms with us in order to safeguard his position. He has once al- ready suffered defeat and experienced our strength and now, after sixteen days have passed, is no longer able to hope that any help will come to him from outside. I also believe that Our Lord will close his mind and harden his heart, because he wants this business of Melaka to be brought to a conclusion so as to open the route through the Straits [of Melaka] to us. The king of Portugal has often commanded me to go to the Straits, because it seemed to His Highness that this was the best place to intercept the trade which the Muslims of Cairo and of Mecca and Jiddah3 carry on in these parts. So it was to do Our Lord's service that we were brought here; by taking Melaka, we would close the Straits so that never again would the Muslims be able to bring their spices by this route.

The other reason I put to you is the great ser- vice that we shall do to King Manuel by taking this city. It is the source of all the spices and drugs that the Muslims ship from here each year to the Straits, without our being able to stop them. If we cut them off from their traditional market, there will be no port or other place in the region as convenient as this that they can use. Since we gained control of the Malabar [southwest Indian] pepper trade, Cairo has not received any except what the Mus- lims have been able to take from this region. Forty or fifty [ships] sail every year from here bound for be recognized as its rightful king. I therefore beg you as a favor to consider well the enterprise you have in hand and not to let it be lost."

When Afonso de Albuquerque had finished his discourse, as I have recorded it, the members of his council put forward varying opinions, some for and some against him. The result of their discussion was that the majority repeated their conviction that is was in the king's service to take the city of Melaka, to expel the Muslims, and to build a fortress there. Afonso de Albuquerque . . . took the side of the majority and decided to attack Melaka and secure his position there. He decided to leave all the questions which had been raised on the other side in the hands of Our Lord Jesus Christ because he would dispose of everything according to his will. He ordered the secretary to draw up an agreement, which he and all the captains, noblemen, and knights who were present signed.