Reference no: EM132290634

Where and how do advances in research/science impact a company’s social responsibility (or lack thereof) in the past?

Case: DuPont faults worker actions in La Porte plant disaster; investigators say causes go deeper

Nearly nine months after a massive toxic gas release killed four workers at a pesticide plant near La Porte, both DuPont and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board have released summaries from a pair of confidential reports that provide competing views of the causes of the accident - the deadliest at any U.S. chemical plant in two decades. DuPont has attributed the causes of that disaster to actions by rank-and-file employees. The company describes a series of workers' activities - including clogged pipes in the pesticide unit and opening valves to clear pipes or to respond to pressure alarms - as triggering a release of 23,000 pounds of methyl mercaptan that fatally poisoned four and caused more than 100 workers to shelter in place at the complex on Nov. 15, 2014, according to an emailed summary the company released Sept. 3. DuPont's pesticide unit remains idle. In July, the Chemical Safety Board, a small federal agency that investigates only the nation's worst industrial accidents, prepared its own confidential 42-page report as part of a successful effort to convince the company to delay a planned summer restart. But in briefings, CSB inspectors say the reasons for the accident run much deeper - its leaders have said DuPont needs to review its corporate safety culture nationwide. Highlights of the CSB report suggest that the entire La Porte pesticide unit and the building that houses it should be studied and might need to be rebuilt and redesigned before it could be operated without posing a threat to workers and to public safety, according to excerpts posted on the CSB website. Workers have told the Houston Chronicle they believe the unit generated about $250,000 a day in profit for DuPont. CSB's investigators also have argued that design flaws in DuPont's complex pesticide production unit - a maze of vessels and pipes - prompted troublesome clogs to occur for months before the accident. The agency also concluded that DuPont's faulty line-clearing procedures meant workers regularly were exposed to toxic fumes for years before the catastrophic leak occurred. And its investigators have said that the plant's inadequate gas detectors and outdated alarms provided workers little or no warning about poisoned air on the third floor of the unit where the accident occurred. Investigator Dan Tillema reported in a July CSB board meeting that DuPont had experienced two to four major releases of methyl mercaptan for two full days before the workers were killed - releases that other public records show DuPont failed to report to environmental regulators as required. He also said CSB investigators have concluded that the entire design of the multi-story building housing DuPont's pesticide unit was flawed, increasing dangers for workers and the public, according to his briefing and to a related PowerPoint presentation posted on the agency website.

Wrongful death suits

DuPont's public summary of its own internal investigation does not mention any of those long-term safety problems as causes of the disaster - though the company has promised to address the CSB's concerns. DuPont has no plans to release its own report to the public. Meanwhile, the CSB announced it will hold a public meeting and vote on releasing its own report on Sept. 30 in Houston. DuPont employee Crystle Wise was the first to raise an alarm after she went inside the pesticide unit to respond to a pressure alarm at 3 a.m. Her supervisor, Wade Baker, who had 40 years experience, went into the building separately either to make emergency repairs or to respond to Wise's call for help. Robert Tisnado and his brother Gilbert "Gibby" Tisnado had been in the control room when Wise's call arrived, and they both died trying to rescue others. All four were poisoned inside the tower housing the unit where DuPont manufactures a popular and inexpensive pesticide called Lannate. Two other workers who attempted to help them also got exposed to the fumes but managed to escape - one with help from Gibby Tisnado. DuPont faces wrongful death lawsuits pending in Harris County district court from relatives of all four dead workers. Clay Dugas, an attorney for the widow of Gibby Tisnado, said it appears that DuPont is not admitting its corporate safety failures in its statement and instead is attempting to minimize its legal liability and shift blame to workers, including dead employees who can't defend themselves. "It's not human errors - it's flawed company programs that led to this catastrophe," Dugas said. "And if they'd had the appropriate warning systems in place on November 2014, then lives would have been saved."

Not assigning blame

DuPont spokesman Aaron Woods argued that DuPont is not playing the blame game. "Since day one, DuPont committed as an organization to take steps to prevent a recurrence," Woods said. "The report is based on factual findings from the investigation team (which included operators) of the actual events and individual actions that occurred that day. The team's recommendations represent steps designed to improve the La Porte plant's safety systems and performance, not apportion blame." Both DuPont's pesticide manufacturing unit - and its separate herbicide manufacturing unit - remain closed for repairs and upgrades after both were cited for deficiencies in two separate inspections by OSHA. Woods said DuPont already has provided its full internal investigation to government agencies investigating the accident and shared it with representatives of the union representing La Porte employees. Woods said hourly operators participated in the investigative team and that "all affected personnel" whose jobs are relevant to the findings will be briefed. The company statement also said DuPont is installing detectors, employing "engineering solutions," upgrading "area operating procedures" and strengthening emergency response.

200 complaints

On the morning of the accident, DuPont struggled to assemble its internal response team, and some of its emergency vehicles did not work. About 100 workers sheltered in place as efforts to contain the gas leak continued throughout the day. DuPont's La Porte personnel had no system in place to measure levels of toxins being released beyond its property lines, the CSB has said, even though DuPont employees told emergency dispatchers there was no threat to the public. Across the Houston metro area, more than 200 people called CenterPoint to report a foul gas odor. Harris County pollution control officials were later asked to investigate those complaints. Most who complained of odors or health problems wrongly believed that there had been a natural gas leak, since methyl mercaptan has a rotting onion smell similar to another gas the company uses to odorize natural gas for safety reasons, county officials concluded. A map of the calls that the Chronicle obtained through a records request shows that many callers were downwind or near DuPont's La Porte plant. Partly in response to those complaints and CSB findings, Harris County commissioners have been asked to review this month whether the county should take legal action to ensure sure the plant is truly safe before the pesticide unit restarts. The Lannate Unit, with its stores of flammable methyl mercaptan, is located near other large units with even bigger stockpiles of toxic gases, including hydrofluoric acid. All of the units in the DuPont chemical complex, located in unincorporated Harris County along the shores of the Upper San Jacinto Bay, share the same emergency response team.