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The following questions are about the competing values framework CVF
Formulate problem as a two-person, zero-sum game and use the concept of dominated strategies to determine the best strategy for each side.
Grim Trigger Practice - Let x = 3. For what values of delta are those trigger strategies an equilibrium? How does this change as y increases
A famous hypnotist performs to a crowd of 350 students and 180 non-students. The hypnotist knows from previous experience that one half of the students and two third on the non-students are hypnotizable.
The 12 permutations of this list of conditions, along with the requirement that the imputation be in X({N}; v), determine the bargaining set relative to this coalitional structure.
Suppose that the set of policies is one-dimensional and that each player's preferences are single-peaked. - Find the core of the q-rule game for any value of q with n/2 ≤ q ≤ n.
Let (N; v) and (N; w) be two coalitional games satisfying v(N) = w(N) and v(S) ≥ w(S) for every coalition S ⊆ N. Prove or disprove each of the following two claims:
Compute the outcome of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. - Show that when δ1 = δ2 player 1 has an advantage.
A problem with an exercise about Cournot game. It is very complex and it is composed by different question and it is impossible for me to write the complete text.
Which of these Nash equilibria can be completed to a sequential equilibrium, and for each such sequential equilibrium, what is the corresponding belief of Player II at his information sets? Justify your answer.
Determine which pair of strategies would competing companies A and B choose given this payoff matrix?
For the game BoS in given Figure, find the max minimizer of each player. Show for each equilibrium, the strategy of neither player guarantees her equilibrium payoff.
At most three typographical errors are found on a page, and (c) more than three typographical errors are found on a page.
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