Reference no: EM135518

INSTRUCTIONS

Answer the three questions below. 

1. Read the text box below and provide an argument diagram with a legend for the argument it contains.

It is fair that anyone who intentionally takes another's life should forfeit their own. Hence, capital punishment is not wrong. In addition, it is cheaper to execute someone than to keep them in prison for fifty years, and society has a right to save money whenever it can. Also, executing murderers serves as a deterrent to others who might be contemplating similar crimes. Thus, society should execute murderers.

2. Read the text box below and provide an argument diagram with a legend for the argument it contains.

And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiii, 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak - a being than which nothing greater can be conceived - understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist....

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

            Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

3. Read the essay below. For each paragraph in the essay, state the function of the paragraph in the essay. Remember that a statement of the function of a paragraph is not the same as a report on the contents of what is said; you should be stating the purpose of the paragraph with respect to the structure of the essay. 

The Ontological Argument, Nils Rauhut

(¶1)      "I remember the precise moment, one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane,... I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back I suddenly threw it in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it, 'Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound.'" Bertrand Russell's intellectual experience is not as rare as one might expect. Many philosophers have been struck by the power of the ontological argument. The argument is without doubt one of the most intriguing and perplexing arguments in the history of Western Philosophy. Alvin Plantinga once remarked that "the ontological argument offers an enormous return on a pretty slim investment." However, in spite of its importance the ontological argument is often more difficult to appreciate than other arguments for the existence of God. Many, who hear the argument for the first time, are inclined to agree with Arthur Schopenhauer and consider the argument nothing more than a "charming joke." This reaction is unfortunate. Although the argument might appear nothing more than a trick of words, the argument is worthy of closer attention. In recent years, the argument has given rise to high quality work in logic and philosophy of language. In the following, I will try to provide a clearheaded introduction to the logic of the ontological argument that is accessible to those who encounter the argument for the first time. Rather than focusing on the famous and historically influential formulations of the argument by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) or René Descartes (1596-1650), I will try to clarify the common logical thread that is shared by various formulations of the argument.

(¶2)      Suppose, for a moment, that you are curious about tigers. There are many things you can learn about tigers by observing them in the jungle. Through observations you can learn whether tigers live in groups or whether tigers hunt rabbits more frequently than deer. However, some insights about tigers can be discovered completely a priori, i.e. without any [essential] appeal to experience. One can know a priori, for example, that tigers are animals. Let us reflect on this claim in more detail. How is it possible to know a priori that all tigers are animals? The standard answer to this question goes as follows. The concept "tiger" contains the concept "animal" within its definition. When we talk about tigers we necessarily talk about certain types of animals. The claim "All tigers are animals" is therefore equivalent to the claim "Certain types of animals are animals," and this, since it is a tautology, is something which we can know a priori.

(¶3)      This example suggests a strategy. When we investigate things we can know some of their properties through experience and other properties through a priori reflection. This is true for everything and consequently it must also be true for God. If we reflect on the concept of God we can discover that the concept of God is necessarily connected with certain other concepts. For example, we can know a priori that God, if he were to exist, must be the most powerful being there is. We know this because the idea of God is by definition the idea of a being that is more powerful than anything else. When we think about God we thereby necessarily also think about the most powerful being. In a similar fashion we can also know a priori that God, if he were to exist, is a being that is all-good and all-knowing. All of these properties of God we can derive from the very concept of God since God, by definition, is the greatest possible being.

(¶4)      The ingenious move of the ontological argument is to focus on the logical relationship between the idea of God and existence. Just as there is a conceptual relationship between the concept of God and being all-powerful and being all good, so there could be a conceptual relationship between the idea of God and existence. But how can we find out whether such a relationship indeed exists? In order to answer this question, it is again useful to consider an unrelated, but clear-cut example. Suppose I suspect that there is a conceptual relationship between being red and being colored. How can one be sure about this? If being red and being colored are indeed related in this way then the denial of such a relationship should lead to a contradiction. So, the sentence

Red things are not colored

should be a contradiction, as indeed it is. It is impossible that red things are not colored and we can conclude therefore that there is indeed a conceptual relationship between being red and being colored. We can use the same strategy to test whether there is a conceptual relationship between the idea of God and existence. If there is such a relationship then the sentence

God does not exist

should lead to a contradiction. At this point it may seem that we have reached an impasse. The sentence "Red things are not colored" clearly contains a contradiction, but the parallel claim that "God does not exist" seems perfectly innocuous. No contradiction seems to be in sight. Defenders of the ontological argument agree that many people do not immediately see any problems with denying the existence of God. They believe, however, that this is caused by a failure to realize that the idea of God is unique among all our ideas. We need to realize that the idea of God is very different from our idea of ordinary physical objects like trees or houses. To say that a certain tree does not exist, is quite fine and logically not problematic, but the idea of God has little in common with our ideas of houses and trees. The idea of God is the idea of the greatest possible being and unless we appreciate the absolute stunning uniqueness of this idea the ontological argument cannot be appreciated.

(¶5)      Let us now return to our test whether there is a conceptual link between God and existence. We have seen that if there is such a link then the sentence "God does not exist" should entail a contradiction. We have also seen that defenders of the ontological argument stress the fact that the idea of God is the idea of the greatest possible being. Hence, the sentence "God does not exist" is really equivalent to the sentence "The greatest possible being does not exist." Is this claim contradictory? Defenders of the ontological argument say "yes." It is impossible that the greatest possible being is simply a figment of our imagination. In order to illustrate this more clearly, consider the case of Superman. Superman is supposedly a superhero who can fly and frequently battles with evil villains. The idea of superman is the idea of a very powerful and virtuous being. However, it is immediately clear that the idea of superman cannot be the idea of the greatest possible being. Superman is a fictional character. We do not believe that Superman exists in the actual world. In this sense the idea of Superman is similar to our ideas of the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, and the Great Pumpkin. The best we can say is that the existence of Superman is logically possible. The fact that the idea of Superman is linked to mere possible existence diminishes the greatness of Superman. The idea of the greatest possible being, on the other hand, must be linked to necessary existence and not merely to possible existence. Once we realize that the idea of the greatest possible being must be linked to necessary existence, we can also understand why the claim that "The greatest possible being does not exist" contains a contradiction. If the sentence were logically acceptable, then the greatest possible being could possibly not exist, and this would link the idea of the greatest possible being to mere possible existence. We have seen, however, that any idea that is merely linked to possible existence, as for instance the idea of Superman or the idea of Santa Claus, cannot be the idea of the greatest possible being. We can conclude, therefore, that the idea of the greatest possible being is unique among all our ideas. It is the only idea that is necessarily connected with its own existence, and we can know therefore that God exists.

(¶6)      The ontological argument has generated a number of well-known criticisms which we need to explore in order to assess the significance of the argument in more detail.

(¶7)      First, we have seen that the starting point of the ontological argument is a clear comprehension of the idea of God. If this idea is blurry or not clearly understood, then the entire ontological argument rests on a shaky foundation. David Hume (1711-1776), for instance, pointed out in this context that we can have clear ideas of dogs or cats, since our ideas of dogs and cats are derived from sense impressions, but that there are no comparable impressions available for God. He concludes, therefore, that the idea of God is pale and without clear meaning. If Hume were correct on this point the very foundation of the ontological argument would be in doubt. However, Hume's criticism here is not decisive. Hume seems to think that we can have clear ideas of something only if we can produce a mental image of that thing. Granted we have no precise image of God, but this does not mean that we can have no clear idea of what kind of being God is. Consider the idea of the greatest natural number. I have no mental image of the greatest natural number in my mind, but I can understand the idea nevertheless very well. I understand the idea so clearly that I am able to deduce that such a number actually does not even exist. The case of God is similar. I have no mental image of God in my mind, but I can nevertheless clearly understand the concept of the greatest possible being. I understand it so clearly that it might be possible to deduce the actual existence of the greatest possible being.

(¶8)      However, David Hume raised a second more powerful objection to the ontological argument. We have seen that the ontological argument is based entirely on a priori considerations. Hume was very puzzled by that. He reflected on the logical status of existence claims. Suppose somebody claims "Polar bears exist." In order to understand this claim we must understand the concept of polar bears. However, more is involved in that claim than the mere concept of polar bears. To say that polar bears exist seems to say that there are certain objects in the world that correspond to the concept of polar bears. The claim thus goes beyond the conceptual realm and requires access to the actual world. Hume concluded, therefore, that existence claims can never be analytic. We can analyze the concept of polar bears all we want, but we will never discover thereby whether polar bears in fact exist. Any existence claim, therefore, requires access to matters of fact and can never be a mere analytic judgment. Hume's claim that existence claims are always synthetic has been very influential, but it is perhaps less decisive than people have assumed it to be. Defenders of the ontological argument can grant Hume nearly everything he says about the logic of existence claims without thereby undermining the plausibility of the ontological argument. It seems clear, for example, that ordinary existence claims like "Polar bears exist" must be synthetic and not analytic. However, we should not forget that the ontological argument does not deal with ordinary objects. Hume gives us no reason why there might not be an exception to the general rule. Although existence claims are nearly exclusively synthetic, it is possible that the case of God, the case of the greatest possible being, confronts us with a unique special case. It is the one case where the existence of a being can be deduced from the concept of that being. It is thus possible to maintain that "God exists" is analytic, even if one agrees with Hume that all ordinary existence claims are synthetic.

(¶9)      Influenced by David Hume, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) tried to strengthen Hume's objection. In order to do this, Kant reflected in more detail on the logical status of "existence." Kant claimed that there was a crucial difference between the following two sentences

Bottlenose dolphins are gray.

and

Bottlenose dolphins exist.

The first sentence tells us something about the concept of bottlenose dolphins. We can conclude from this sentence that anything that is not gray cannot be a bottlenose dolphin. If we had to find bottlenose dolphins in nature knowing that bottlenose dolphins are gray would offer us some real help. However, knowing the second sentence would not help us in our quest to identify a bottlenose dolphin. It is certainly nice to know that bottlenose dolphins exist, but this knowledge does not help us at all in finding and recognizing these animals in nature. Kant concluded from this that "existence" cannot be a defining feature of anything. When we say that something exists we are not defining this thing, but we are simply positing that something that corresponds to the idea exists in the world. Kant, thus, coined the phrase that existence is not a real predicate and thus not a defining property of any object. This insight has often been seen as a fatal blow to the ontological argument. As we have seen, the ontological argument requires that "existence" is a defining feature of the greatest possible being. If Kant is right, this claim has to be abandoned. Just as it is not possible to define bottlenose dolphins by saying that bottlenose dolphins exist, it is equally vacuous to say that existence is a feature of the greatest possible being. Although Kant's criticism of the ontological argument has been widely accepted, it is not entirely clear to what degree Kant's criticism succeeds. Even if we were to grant Kant the point that existence is not a real predicate and thus not a defining characteristic of anything, one can still argue that "necessary existence" is such a predicate. As we have seen above, the crucial element in formulating the ontological argument is the claim that the greatest possible being exists necessarily, and this claim might not be affected by Kant's criticism.

(¶10)    Let us consider a final and perhaps most famous objection to the ontological argument. Shortly after St. Anselm formulated the ontological argument for the first time, a fellow monk Gaunilo raised a worry. Does the ontological argument not perhaps establish too much? Suppose it is possible to prove the existence of a greatest possible being would it not be also possible to prove, in a similar way, the existence of other perfect entities like perfect islands or perfect cars? Since we know that perfect islands and perfect cars do not exist, we can conclude therefore that something fundamental has to be wrong with the ontological argument. Is Gaunilo right, does the ontological argument permit us to prove the existence of perfect islands? At first glance, Gaunilo seems to have a point. Suppose that the greatest island does not exist. In this case there could be an even greater island just like the greatest island but which actually exists. This, however, is impossible since we are now committed to the claim that there is a greater island than the greatest possible island. So, the assumption that the greatest possible island does not exist leads to a contradiction. It seems to follow therefore that the greatest island must exist. At first glance Guanilo's objection seems a devastating reductio ad absurdum of the ontological argument, but further reflection raises concerns about the cogency of Gaunilo's counterexample. It seems clear that the ontological argument can only be applied to entities that have a maximum. For example, consider all beings that are morally good. In this case it makes sense to say that among these beings there must be a best. The property of moral goodness has a maximum. However, the same cannot be said about islands. No single island is capable of being the greatest possible island. For any island one imagines there is always a greater island possible. If this line of reasoning is correct, Gaunilo's criticism seems much less threatening. It seems false to claim that the ontological argument allows us to prove the existence of a great number of absurd non-existent things.

(¶11)    The debate about the cogency of the ontological argument is still in full swing. A final resolution is not in sight. Much of the contemporary debate is more sophisticated and detailed than the description of the argument above. Nevertheless, I hope that I have provided enough detail to convince beginning students that the ontological argument should not be dismissed out of hand. There is a small chance that Hegel's assessment of the argument as the sole and sound demonstration of the existence of God might be vindicated after all. If this is so, the argument is certainly worthy of continued study and exploration.