Reference no: EM133083041

1. For each of the games listed below, draw out the extensive form (game tree) of the game. Assume each decision node is a full information node, or that the player knows what decisions were made before them. For each game identify all subgames, and all subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). You can make up your own numbers for all games unless otherwise indicated. Explain if there is a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage in each game

a. Two-shot Prisoners Dilemma (i.e., playing Prisoners Dilemma two times in a row.)

b. Two-shot chicken (note the game ends if the players crash in the first round.)

c. One-shot Hawk-Dove with variables V and C. Make sure to check for changes to SPE's based on different values of V and C.

d. One-shot matching pennies.