Reference no: EM13838557
In the Jehle and Reny textbook (which I should add I have not read much of beyond a few sections of interest), a theorem stating that there is always a (mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite strategic form games is proven. The book assumes that all players have the same number of actions available, but it's not difficult to imagine how this might be extended to the case where this isn't true.
What I'm interested in, however, is whether there is some extension of this to games, particularly those where there may be infinite choices. For instance, there's clearly no equilibrium in a game where a player wins by picking the highest number, but if we have, for instance, the same game, but where the number must be within the interval [0,100] (or any interval that contains its upper bound), the best response functions "converge". Similarly, I would also suspect that there need to be "well-behaved" cost and demand functions in competition models to get "good" results.
As such, I have two questions:
Is there any sort of well-defined setting in which a game with infinite strategy choices will have a Nash equilibrium?
What would relevant reading for this be?
|
Impact of merger control on economy-wide market structure
: What are the studies that control for changes in technology, capital availability and perhaps other factors and quantify the impact of merger control on economy-wide market structure/concentration measures?
|
|
Examples of immizerizing growth
: For a course in international trade, our professor touched on the idea of immiserizering growth. He emphasized that immiserizing growth was a theoretical outcome from specialization of trade and did not provide the class with examples on the global m..
|
|
Optimal taxation literature-kind of policy prescriptions
: One common criticism in the optimal taxation literature is the specification of the social welfare function. The optimal taxation literature (I have the Mirrlees framework in mind) relies on first specifying a social welfare function. what kind of po..
|
|
Measurement and reciprocity of social cost
: Two common drawbacks of Pigouvian subsidy mentioned in the literature are related to monetisation and measurement of social cost (Baumol) and reciprocity of social cost (Coase). What alternatives to Pigouvian taxes are proposed in the literature? Hav..
|
|
Nash equilibrium in finite strategic form games is proven
: In the Jehle and Reny textbook (which I should add I have not read much of beyond a few sections of interest), a theorem stating that there is always a (mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite strategic form games is proven. Similarly, I would also suspect..
|
|
What is interpretation of random choice for individual DM
: Due to McFadden Economists usually interpret Random Choice, in the population sense, as each DM being drawn from the probabilistic choice rule independently and identically. However, Psychologist has maintained that individual DM is actually stochast..
|
|
What are adverse selection and moral hazard
: What is monetary policy and who is responsible for its implementation? What is the central bank and what does it do? What are adverse selection and moral hazard?
|
|
Theory of poverty traps
: As far as I can tell, research on the economics of poverty is very empirically driven, and this is probably appropriate. What kind of economic theory has been developed though? I'd also be interested in theory of some influence too. As an example, I ..
|
|
About the machina paradox and the expected utility model
: This question is related to this question about the Machina paradox and about the expected utility model. In this question, I'd like to know a little more about various or even competing ways of specifying utility and decision making. It'd be nice if..
|