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Question 1. Consider the following normal-form game:
Player 2
x y
a 8; 5 2; 7
Player 1 b 0; 0 2; 4
(a) Find and report all of the (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria of this game.
Nash equilibria:
(b) Consider the two-period repeated game in which this stage game is played twice and the repeated-game payos are simply the sum of the payos in each of the two periods. Is there a subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game in which (a, x) is played in the rst period? If so, fully describe the equilibrium. If not, explain why.
Circle one: YES NO
Description/explanation:
Player 1 has the following set of strategies {A1;A2;A3;A4}; player 2’s set of strategies are {B1;B2;B3;B4}. Use the best-response approach to find all Nash equilibria.
A supplier and a buyer, who are both risk neutral, play the following game, The buyer’s payoff is q^'-s^', and the supplier’s payoff is s^'-C(q^'), where C() is a strictly convex cost function with C(0)=C’(0)=0. These payoffs are commonly known.
Pertaining to the matrix need simple and short answers, Find (a) the strategies of the firm (b) where will the firm end up in the matrix equilibrium (c) whether the firm face the prisoner’s dilemma.
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