Justify the finite symmetric repeated game

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Reference no: EM131449779

Question: Consider a finite symmetric repeated game, and assume there is a symmetric mutual minmax profile m* in pure strategics, i.e., a pure-strategy profile m such that maxa. g(ai,m*i) ≤v. Show that, if public randomizations are available, for sufficiently large discount factors the worst strongly symmetric equilibrium payoff e* can be attained with stratgies that have two phases: In phase A, players play m*. If players conform in phase A, play switches to phase B with a probability specified by the equilibrium strategies; if there are any deviations, play remains in phase A with probability 1. In phase B, play follows strategies that yield the highest equilibrium payoff.

Reference no: EM131449779

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