Reference no: EM131325714

Journal Analysis

LESSON NOTES: Regulatory Issues in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

"The emergency response community in the United States needs to avoid complacency and continue to prepare for a wide range of potential terrorist attacks that will likely include chemical, biological, radiological or explosive material,...Training is a critical element of preparedness, and the center's fully funded training opportunities for state, tribal and local emergency responders are designed to prepare individuals and teams for what may be reality."

Rick Dickson, Assistant Director of Training Delivery for

FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP)

The 1997 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill is the foundation of the United States domestic preparedness plan. The 1997 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill is the bill that "funded enhancements to the capabilities of emergency responders in incidents involving nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism" (Gaskill 2005). Threats against the United States and the population are actual and the necessity for ready first responders continues to be critical. First responders must remain vigilant and continue to enhance their skills with the preparedness knowledge to protect the cities and populations they serve (Arledge 2010).

After September 11, 2001, the President Bush recognized the need to change our strategy to address the new challenges of terrorism and proliferation. In 2002, the President put forth a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD, he established objectives tailored to meet the threat of WMD terrorism:

• Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to acquire and develop WMD.
• Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities needed
• to develop WMD.
• Deter terrorists from employing WMD.
• Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons,
• and personnel.
• Prevent and be prepared to respond to WMD-related terrorist attacks.
• Develop the capability to determine the nature and scope of a terrorist-employed device. (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 2002)

However, after more than a decade, the use of WMDs, whether by a state or non-state actor, a terrorist group, or lone wolf, poses a potentially significant threat to the United States. One of the paramount concerns is that terrorists will develop their own WMD or that an already developed WMD may fall into the hands of terrorists.

What we know is that according to the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009), the vast majority of states have rejected, and we hope will continue to reject, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but the latent capacity to produce such weapons is reaching unprecedented heights. The steady progress of technology brings not only the danger of new weapons in the hands of new actors, but also a new context in which proliferation will occur. Increasingly, these technologies belong not just to the few, but to the many states with the capacity for modern medical science, pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and nuclear energy. A state with a space-launch capacity has a virtual long-range ballistic missile capability, just as the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (including in civilian roles) provides new and effective means to deliver chemical and biological weapons. A state with an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability is well on its way to having nuclear weapons; and for states with modern pharmaceutical or chemical industries, the ability to possess biological or advanced chemical weapons is limited far more by intent than capability. (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2009).

There are other worrisome trends. Evidence suggests that in some regions the taboos associated with nuclear weapons are weakening, while the perception of prestige and security benefits is on the rise. In addition, complex network dynamics are changing the ways states can acquire nuclear capabilities and marginalizing traditional control mechanisms. The discovery of the A.Q. Khan network exposed weaknesses in the nonproliferation regime's ability to detect and prevent black market transactions in nuclear technology, design, and expertise. Moreover, an increase in nuclear proliferation may also help renew interest in biological and chemical weapons as the "poor man's nuclear weapons." (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2009)

Finally, as WMD-enabling technologies become more widely proliferated, the opportunity for theft, leakage, or transfer to other state or non-state actors can only grow. Weak or unstable regional nuclear powers may lack sufficient safety and security controls over their nuclear weapons, materials, or equipment. The collapse or compromise of a WMD-armed state could lead to the sudden and potentially catastrophic leakage or transfer of WMD capabilities to terrorists or state actors. (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2009)

With this increased threat of proliferation comes the increased need to ensure we have effective WMD regulation, response, and preparedness. The United States does have:

FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), located in Anniston, Alabama, is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s only federally chartered Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training center. The CDP began operations in June 1998 as the only all-hazards training center, offering training on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) weapons. While the training tempo has increased dramatically, the CDP's training programs provide the very best in advanced hands-on training for America's emergency responders. On March 31, 2007, the Noble Training Facility (NTF) was transferred from the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) to the CDP. NTF is the only hospital facility in the United States dedicated to training hospital and healthcare professionals in disaster preparedness and response. (Center for Domestic Preparedness 2014)

However, is this enough?

What we know is Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), United States Policy on Counterterrorism, "directs that measures be taken to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of WMD. To support this goal, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the Terrorism Incident Annex (TIA) to the Federal Response Plan (FRP). What is important to note with regard to emergency response is the TIA distinguishes between crisis and consequence management as follows" (U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division 2010):

Crisis management refers to measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The federal government has primary responsibility to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; state and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response. Based on the situation, a federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations and by federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently. (U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division 2010)

Consequence management

Consequence managment includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The local and state authorities have primary responsibility to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the federal government provides assistance as necessary. (U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division 2010)

However, it appears after many readings, studies' surveys, etc., the United States is not prepared to provide and effective initial response to a WMD incident and, as a whole is not fully prepared to provide a coordinated response. Further, the existing response policies and plans do not comply with national policy and are outdated and preparations for responding to a WMD incident are inconsistent and not well coordinated.

The big question is - Where do we go from here....

Question to Consider

1. Does the United States properly train for a WMD attack on the homeland?

2. Is the Center for Domestic Preparedness enough?

3. Is the United States prepared to minimizes the adverse impact of an incident involving WMD/CRNE materials upon life, health, property and the environment

4. Are traditional hazardous materials and emergency medical procedures inadequate to respond to a WMD event?

5. Are medical public health systems optimally prepared to respond to a WMD event?

6. Despite the recent terrorist activities, local health departments and hospitals are still reluctant to spend resources in preparation for events with a low probability of occurring, such as WMD incidents; is this proper course of action?

7. What particular problems face states seeking to manage the proliferation environment, and what steps are proliferant actors taking to evade detection?

References/Works Cited:

Arledge, S. (2010). Preparing for Weapons of Mass Destruction Attack and Response. Retrieved from: www.emergencymgmt.com

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. (2009) Are We Prepared? Four WMD Crises That Could Transform U.S. Security. Washington, D.C.

National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (2014). https://cdp.dhs.gov/about/consortium/

Gaskill, J. (2005). WMD Preparedness. Retrieved from: https://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/publications/WMD%20Preparedness.pdf?DocID=59

Office of the President of the United States. (1994). Executive Order 12938; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.

Office of the President of the United States. (2002). National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.

U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism (1995). Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD39). Retrieved from: https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division. (2010). Review of the Department's Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident. Washington, D.C.

This week you will select a relative writing regarding the regulation of, or response to WMD.

Make the usual Forum post by preparing a minimum 350 word abstract to your article (DO NOT just repost your article).

You want to treat this like an abstract so that your fellow classmates get a good feel for what your article covers. In an abstract, you need to use your own words to describe the key points of your journal article. Abstracts do NOT have in-text citations in the body of the work.