Reference no: EM133627392

In chapter five, Hume believes he provides a solution to the apparent circularity he pointed to in chapter four. He argues that knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships comes not from our reason, but from simply becoming accustomed, after a repetition of similar experiences, to expect one specific event/observation to be followed by a second specific event/observation which previously and repeatedly corresponded to the first. Hume calls this natural inclination of the mind, custom (EN 5.1.4-6). Later, Hume defines the difference between fiction (mere imaginings) and belief as a feeling/sentiment that is present in beliefs that is not in mere fictions. This "sentiment" of belief is a conception more "steady and intense" than any feeling that we have about our mere imaginings, and this sentiment of belief arises when the object of the belief is based in our direct experience of customary connections (Hume, EN 5.2.13). Hume goes on to argue that this sentiment will be stronger or weaker given the resemblance, closeness, and repetition of our experiences of the object (EN 5.2.14-18).

Human beings choose to believe many different kinds of things, some of which are not based in direct experience. For example, here are three beliefs that I have: I am typing this on my laptop, my younger brother is in Germany, and there is a NASA robot on Mars. Based on my experience, all of these beliefs are true, but the first should feel stronger than the others according to Hume. Is Hume correct that the beliefs we have that are based in our direct experiences are stronger than those that are not?