Reference no: EM133697840

Assignment:

TOPIC: The System Worked: Vietnam and Afghanistan

I am trying something new. Tell me how the foreign policy system "worked" in Afghanistan? I want you to view Afghanistan through a discussion of Vietnam. There is a specific set of questions for you to discuss at the end.

First read the short blurb on this book from the Brookings Institute Website: "The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked" below

"Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years.

That is what the system-the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures-was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus far of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter."

2) This is Gaddis Smith's review of Gelb and Betts "The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked" that appeared in Foreign Affairs in the Summer of 1979.

"If an historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it. It is simultaneously a history and an analysis of American decision-making and a valuable historiographical critique of the literature and interpretations of the subject. The main theme is the domination of American policy by the doctrine of containment, which "worked" throughout the period of American military involvement. The authors recommend that "Presidents should eschew ambitious new conceptual and overall policy doctrines"-such as undifferentiated "containment"-and that "dissent should be institutionalized by rewards and promotions." Gelb directed the compilation of the Pentagon Papers and is now director of politico-military affairs in the State Department."

Now have a discussion about how the same issues and lessons in this book applies to Afghanistan. How did the system work-- across the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations? A system where all information on Afghanistan was understood and vetted with eyes wide open about the situation. Just rework the sentence: "With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in... Afghanistan" How did the system work?

Secondly, address how Gaddis Smith's recommendation of "dissent should be institutionalized" actually impossible-- especially in the current political hyper-partisan political climate egged on my a 24/7 meat grinder of media.