Already have an account? Get multiple benefits of using own account!
Login in your account..!
Remember me
Don't have an account? Create your account in less than a minutes,
Forgot password? how can I recover my password now!
Enter right registered email to receive password!
(Darwin's theory of the sex ratio) A population of males and females mate pairwise to produce offspring. Suppose that each offspring is male with probability p and female with probability 1 - p. Then there is a steady state in which the fraction p of the population is male and the fraction 1 - p is female. If p ∗= 1 then males and females have different numbers of offspring (on average). Is such an equilibrium evolutionarily stable? Denote the number of children born to each female by n, so that the number of children born to each male is (p/(1 - p))n. Suppose a mutation occurs that produces boys and girls each with probability 1 .
Assume for simplicity that the mutant trait is dominant: if one partner in a couple has it, then all the offspring of the couple have it. Assume also that the number of children produced by a female with the trait is n, the same as for "normal" members of the population. Since both normal and mutant females produce the same number of children, it might seem that the ?tness of a mutant is the same as that of a normal organism. But compare the number of grand children of mutants and normal organisms. How many female offspring does a normal organism produce? How many male offspring? Use your answers to ?nd the number of grandchildren born to each mutant and to each normal organism. Does the mutant invade the population? Which value (values?) of p is evolutionarily stable?
Write a paper that uses game theory to to set up a game designed to help a consumer decide whether to buy life insurance or not.
Determine the expression for the number of customers served at each cart. (Recall that Cart O gets the customers between O and x, or just x, while Cart 1gets the customers betv.reen x and l, or 1 - x.)
you must work alone to complete this quiz. do not share answers or ideas with other students. write your answers
For multiple sclerosis patients we wish to estimate the mean age at which the disease was first diagnosed. We want a 90% confidence interval that is 8 years wide. If the population variance is estimated to be 85 from previous research, how large a..
Suppose you are planning entering a market serviced through a monopolist. You currently receive $0 economic profits, while monopolist receives $5.
Radon levels in a house vary from week to week. In one house a sample of 8 weeks had the following readings for radon level ( in pCi/L): 1.9, 2.8, 5.7, 4.2, 1.9, 8.6, 3.9, 7.2
Assume that there are 10 pencils available of each color, and different children are allowed to choose the same color.
You are using the Durbin-Watson statistic to discover whether the value of your dependent variable at time t is related to its value at the previous time period.
A supplier and a buyer, who are both risk neutral, play the following game, The buyer’s payoff is q^'-s^', and the supplier’s payoff is s^'-C(q^'), where C() is a strictly convex cost function with C(0)=C’(0)=0. These payoffs are commonly known.
Find all of the Nash equilibria in this game. How might this simultaneous version of the street-garden game be played out in reality?
If each group had 15 officers, how would you characterize the performance of the typical officer in each squad?
What is her payoff if she deviates to a lower or higher effort level? Is any action profile in which not all the players' effort levels are the same a Nash equilibrium?
Get guaranteed satisfaction & time on delivery in every assignment order you paid with us! We ensure premium quality solution document along with free turntin report!
whatsapp: +1-415-670-9521
Phone: +1-415-670-9521
Email: [email protected]
All rights reserved! Copyrights ©2019-2020 ExpertsMind IT Educational Pvt Ltd