Reference no: EM133346327
Reading Questions
1. What is the difference between having a mental image and having a pure understanding? Give your own example of each.
2. According to Descartes, how does the mind or soul (what he here called "a thinking thing") differ from the body?
3. What did Descartes mean when he said that he could "conceive of my whole self" as something that lacks the power or ability to sense or to have mental images?
4. Restate in your own words the argument Descartes provided that led him to the conclusion that physical objects exist.
5. What did Descartes mean when he said that his mind was indivisible but his body was divisible?
Critical Questions
1. In the first Meditation, Descartes was skeptical about how confident we can be in distinguishing dreaming from waking. Then he became more confident about making the distinction. According to Descartes here in the sixth Meditation, how can dreaming be distinguished from waking? Do you agree? Why or why not?
2. If Descartes has convinced you that you are made of two substances, a mental substance or mind-which is unextended in space, indivisible, and capable of pure understanding-and a body-which is extended in space, divisible, and capable of sensation, how can the two interact? Present an argument to support your answer.
3. If Descartes has not convinced you that you are made of two substances, must you believe that your mind is physical substance which is extended in space and divisible? Present an argument to support your answer.
Reading Questions
1. What is wrong with maintaining that the soul is sensation?
2. What is wrong with maintaining that the soul is not sensation?
3. What is wrong with maintaining that sensation is a faculty of the soul?
4. Because the notions of the soul and of surviving death are closely related, what must a Buddhist monk who rejects these theories of the soul believe about a perfected being who has died?
5. How did King Menander (Milinda) argue against Nagasena's assertion that the name Nagasena is only a practical designation and does not refer to any permanent individual?
6. How did Nagasena counter the King's argument?
Critical Questions
1. Who do you think makes the more plausible case, Nagasena or King Menander (Milinda)? Explain what their position is and explain why you believe their position is more plausible.
2. What unanswered questions do these readings leave you with? What do you think would be good answers to your questions?
Reading Questions
1. What are the alternative answers to the question "where am I" that Dennett faces immediately after the surgery (and before he assigns names to his brain and body)?
2. How does the idea of a "point of view" support the notion that Dennett is "wherever he thinks he is"?
3. What philosophical "revelation" occurs to Dennett when the radio links between his brain and body are broken?
Critical Questions
1. Would you, like Dennett (immediately after the surgery), conclude that you are where your body is and not where your brain is? Why or why not?
2. Where is your "self" located? Is it in your body or outside of your body? Does it even make sense to ask where your self is located? Using this essay, present an argument for your view.
3. Does the popular idea that our self is our soul solve any of Dennett's problems about where he is located? If so, how does it? If not, why not?
Reading Questions
1. Explain what McCloskey means when she says, "My gender crossing was motivated by identity, not by a balance sheet of utility"?
2. McCloskey writes, "Gender is not in every way natural." Why is this the case?
3. Why was McCloskey attracted to Christianity?
Critical Questions
1. In your view, is gender identity natural or is it socially constructed? Support your answer with an argument that would be plausible to someone regardless of their religious beliefs.
2. McCloskey argues that "gender crossing is a good deal like foreign travel." Assess her analogy. Do you think that there could be a better comparison to make? Are there ways in which it could be improved? Explain your thinking.