Reference no: EM133346657

Question: What role might the distinction between theory and ideology (which Maimonides ultimately imbibes from Greek thought and Judaism) play in his resistance to the category of faith, and to his assigning primacy to the category of reason in making sense of human beings' reception of the category of God? How does the human explanatory pyramid leave space for -- or openly invite -- the introduction of the category of God? What factor plays a primary (if not an ostensibly constitutive) role in enabling the God-concept to serve as the apex of the explanatory pyramid? What disables the God-concept from performing in this role? In what sense(s) would it be true to say that even if it succeeded in accomplishing this goal it would fail, because the infinite regress haunting the whole category of explanation would re-surface?

Why wouldn't the problematic disclosed and highlighted by the questions raised in the previous paragraph be enough to undermine altogether the category of "God"? What factor(s) connoted by the adversarial category to religious belief, namely skepticism, also logically suggest the need for the supersession of the God-concept? Why can't skepticism declare unconditional victory over religious belief? What logical factors intervene to preclude this outcome? How can Maimonides' exhortation on the unlimited scope of human freedom be viewed as his response to the paradoxes and contradictions attendant to the notion of God alluded to in the previous paragraph and a half? How can his stance on the category of human freedom be viewed as a significant rehabilitation of the category of faith?

How does Maimonides naturalization of the category of faith spill over into his naturalization of the categories of prophecy, miracles, the messianic age, and the vision of the human self encapsulated in his concept of Teshuvah (repentance)?

How does Maimonides theorizing of monotheism engender and foster a rapprochement and highlight the confluence between Western and Eastern religion?