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Answer the following questions for each one of the games below, whose payoffs are in R2.
(a) Draw the sets R1(p) and R2(q), for every p and q.
(b) Find four B-sets for Player 1.
(c) Find four B-sets for Player 2.
For the game BoS in given Figure, find the max minimizer of each player. Show for each equilibrium, the strategy of neither player guarantees her equilibrium payoff.
Calculate each player's best-response function as a function of the opposing player's pure strategy. - Find and report the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Find the given probability - Offense wins both comparisons (and thus defense loses two armies). - Defense wins both comparisons (and thus offense loses two armies).
Represent this game in the normal form by describing the strategy spaces and payoff functions. - For the case in which X > Y, compute the Nash equilibria of the litigation game.
The time it takes a symphony orchestra to play beethovens ninth symphony has a normal distribution with a mean of 64.3 minutes and a standard deviation of 1.15 minutes. If an orchestra plays it so slowly that 80% of the orchestras play faster than..
assume there are two countries involved in a war. country a is considering invading country b through a bridge which is
Model this situation as a Bayesian game and show that in any Nash equilibrium the highest prize that either individual is willing to exchange is the smallest possible prize.
Construct the normal form of game assuming consumers move simultaneously and choose between two strategies: "Adopt" or "Don't Adopt." Solve for any (pure strategy) Nash equilibria.
Construct a belief space in which the described situation is represented by a state of the world and indicate that state.- What is the minimal belief subspace of each of the three players.
Find the set of Nash equilibria of this game.- Prove that the set of correlated equilibria of this game is the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria.
Consider a sealed-bid first-price auction with three buyers,- Find a symmetric equilibrium of the game.- What is the seller's expected revenue?
Calculate Harvey's choosing, selling, and buying prices (ptc, pts, and ptb respectively). Who is more loss averse: the person whose preferences we studied in class or Harvey's?
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