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Guessing Morra:-
In the two-player game "Guessing Morra", each player simultaneously holds up one or two fingers and also guesses the total shown. If exactly one player guesses correctly then the other player pays her the amount of her guess (in $, say). If either both players guess correctly or neither does so then no payments are made.
a. Specify this situation as a strategic game.
b. Use the symmetry of the game to show that the unique equilibrium payoff of each player is 0.
c. Find the mixed strategies of player 1 that guarantee that her payoff is at least 0, and hence find all the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
where time is measured in months and 0
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