Find all subgame nash equilibria of finitely repeated game

Assignment Help Game Theory
Reference no: EM132198924

Question: Suppose that two players, Bob and John, play the following matrix game.

Bob\John left center right
top 0,0 0,0 0,0
middle 0,0 3,3 7,0
bottom 0,0 0,7 6,6

Part a: Find all of the game's pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Now suppose that the players play this game twice in a row. They observe what each other did in the first stage before they decide what to do in the second stage. Each player's payoff is the (undiscounted) sum of his payoffs in the first and second stages.

Part b: Find all Subgame Nash Equilibria of this finitely repeated game.

Part c: Why may it be possible to support non-equilibrium outcomes in a stage game when the game is repeated a finite number of times.

Part d: Why might it be possible to support cooperation in an infinitely-repeated

Reference no: EM132198924

Questions Cloud

Minimum average total cost curves : Companies can typically maximize their profits by operating at the minimum average total cost curves, independent of the economic environment.
What is the implied risk premium : Does uncovered interest parity hold in this example? If so, how do you know? If not, what is the implied risk premium? Which deposits pay a higher expected.
Demonstrate a function in scheme language : Write and fully demonstrate a function in "Scheme language" named super-duper, with this interface.
Write a function that takes two parameters : Write a function called findMedian that takes two parameters - an array of int and the size of the array.
Find all subgame nash equilibria of finitely repeated game : Find all of the game's pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Now suppose that the players play this game twice in a row. They observe what each other did in the first.
What is the situation of the private sector in each period : In 2009 country has a fiscal deficit of 4.2% of its GDP and it has a deficit in the external sector of 2.6% of its GDP.
Write a function called truncate : Write a function called truncate. It is passed 2 parameters, a float f and an integer d.
Is there an economic reason for this : Retailer companies sell many products for which manufacturers have a suggested retail price printed on the package.
Discuss what would be the given changes : Do you believe major changes in current orchard operations (in terms of horticulture and financial management) have to happen in order for apple operations.

Reviews

Write a Review

Game Theory Questions & Answers

  Problem with an exercise about cournot game

A problem with an exercise about Cournot game. It is very complex and it is composed by different question and it is impossible for me to write the complete text.

  What is minimal belief subspace of each of the three players

Construct a belief space in which the described situation is represented by a state of the world and indicate that state.

  Confidence interval for the mean life of new type of bulb

A manufacturer of a new, less expensive type of light bulb claims that this product is very well made and even more reliable than the higher priced competitive light bulbs.

  Compute the nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria

Compute the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria for the following games. - Do so by writing the normal-form matrices for each game and its subgames.

  Find all pure strategy bayesian nash equilibria for game

Draw this game in extensive form. -  Using a matrix representation, find all the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria for this game.

  Experimental design class polled regarding number of hours

Samples of our students from an applied experimental design class were polled regarding the number of hours they spent studying for the last exam. All students anonymously submitted the number of hours on a 3x5 card.

  Find all the mixed strategy equilibria of the game

Specify this situation as a strategic game. -  Use the symmetry of the game to show that the unique equilibrium payoff of each player is 0.

  Prove finite belief space has a consistent belief subspace

Prove or disprove: Every finite belief space has a consistent belief subspace.- Prove or disprove: If Y˜ i(ω) is inconsistent for some player i ∈ N, then Y˜ (ω) is also inconsistent.

  How many nash equilibria does this game have

Determine whether this game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player selects X with probability p. If you can find such an equilibrium, what is p?

  Horse trading game with large seller

Assume that there are at least two non owners, both of whose values of a horse exceed σ1. Find the core of this game.

  Find the core of the q rule game for any value

Suppose that the set of policies is one-dimensional and that each player's preferences are single-peaked. - Find the core of the q-rule game for any value of q with n/2 ≤ q ≤ n.

  If a nash equilibrium is not strict

If it is true, explain why. If it is false, provide a game that illustrates that it is false. "If a Nash equilibrium is not strict, then it is not efficient."

Free Assignment Quote

Assured A++ Grade

Get guaranteed satisfaction & time on delivery in every assignment order you paid with us! We ensure premium quality solution document along with free turntin report!

All rights reserved! Copyrights ©2019-2020 ExpertsMind IT Educational Pvt Ltd