Reference no: EM133080615

For a two-player game, the payoff function for player 1 is V](X[, 1;) = 11 + 10 x. 1;, and for player 2 is Vz?n, xx) = 12 + 20 x: 32. The players' strategies are continuous. Player 1's strategy set (i.e. the values that x: can take) is the interval [0,100], and player 2's strategy set (i.e. the values that It; can take) is the interval [0,50]. Find all Nash equilibria. Hint: Recall our discussion about the intuition behind using the ?rst-order-condition to get the max value of a function. What would it mean to have the ?rst-order-derivative of the utility ?mction to have a nonzero value?