Already have an account? Get multiple benefits of using own account!
Login in your account..!
Remember me
Don't have an account? Create your account in less than a minutes,
Forgot password? how can I recover my password now!
Enter right registered email to receive password!
Task Description
Critical evaluation of games is an important skill for games designers. You will need to evaluate slitherio or choose one of the top 20 games in the last 3 years to critically evaluate with the intention of identifying those aspects that work well and recommendations for improvements. Your task is to research game design literature to locate current, relevant games theories and evaluate your game within the context of those theories.
Game theories related to game mechanics, game usability, game design patterns, playability heuristics and the context of the game are examples of those which may be considered relevant to your critical evaluation. Your essay should briefly explain the games theories, how they apply to your game and the implications thereof.
The list of references should form the last page of the assessment. Your list of references is expected to include at least two peer reviewed (scientific) journal or conference publications. As a guideline, the main body of your essay should be approximately 1500 words.
Please select appropriate game, so you can write in academic language, please don’t use paraphrasing tools, use good references as well. Please write report in simple language
Describe this situation as an extensive-form game.- What is the set of pure strategies each player has?- Find all the subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
A certain lottery game is played by choosing four numbers from 1 to 15 (no repetition of numbers;order of the numbers does not matter).
Given a strategic-form game G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), write out a linear program whose set of solution vectors is the set of correlated equilibria of the game.
Solve this bargaining problem using the standard bargaining solution, under the assumption that Ashley and the YMCA have equal bargaining weights of 1/2. What job description and salary do they agree to? Explain.
What is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game and Find all SPNE of this game. For each SPNE write the payoffs which players receive.
Suppose that you do a test for H0: μ = 6 against HA: μ &neq; 6 you obtain a sample mean of 6.5 and the test gives you a a p-value of 6%. We want to connect the p-value to the confidence interval for the mean.
Compute the value in mixed strategies of the game below.- Compute what each player can guarantee using behavior strategies.
In a public opinion poll, 48% of 189 respondents favor an elimination of taxes on dividend income.
Show that this disagreement outcome can be supported by a Nash equilibrium regardless of the number of bargaining periods.
Find the set of Nash equilibria of this game.- Prove that the set of correlated equilibria of this game is the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria.
If player 1 is not type ß, then what probability would player 1 assign to the event that a letter sent by player 1 was lost in the mail? Show that there is no Bayesian equilibrium of this game in which player 2 ever chooses x2.
Represent this game in the normal form by describing the strategy spaces and payoff functions. - For the case in which X > Y, compute the Nash equilibria of the litigation game.
Get guaranteed satisfaction & time on delivery in every assignment order you paid with us! We ensure premium quality solution document along with free turntin report!
whatsapp: +1-415-670-9521
Phone: +1-415-670-9521
Email: [email protected]
All rights reserved! Copyrights ©2019-2020 ExpertsMind IT Educational Pvt Ltd