Reference no: EM132592420

Question 1: Abbott and Snidal (2000) argue that international actors often deliberately choose softer forms of legalization as superior institutional arrangements. However, the authors also highlight the importance of hard-law, especially when the likelihood of opportunism and its costs are high and non-compliance is hard to detect. Assessing the benefits and costs of both hard-law and soft-law, which one would you think would be more appropriate for international environmental regime? Do you think hard law is more suitable in environmental regimes due to the problems of externalities? Do you think soft law is a better choice because of its dynamic nature and potential to learn and accommodate change with time? Elaborate on your answer with examples and theoretical arguments.

Question 2: CITES concluding statement: "Of all the reasons for the relative success of CITES, it is its administrative system which stands out. The existence of a permanent Secretariat and the numerous administrative obligations imposed on the Parties - to set up at least two bodies to enforce the Convention, to communicate regularly with other Parties, to communicate regularly with the Secretariat and to meet regularly to review implementation of the Convention - are all critical factors." Do you think a strong administrative system is critical to international environmental regimes, or do you think the specificity (and precision) of the issue helped establish strong institutional arrangement? Do you think such strong administrative system is possible in a complex and dynamic issue such as climate change?