Reference no: EM133448320

In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus argues that a Pyrrhonic skepticism - which involves suspending judgments about all things (moral, political, aesthetic, scientific, spiritual) - follows from the fact that different persons, animals, and living beings will have different perceptions of the same object (or issue, or perspective, or data, or...).

A human will have a different perception of a red object than a dog; a conservative a different perception of abortion policy than a liberal; a theist a different perception of the existence of God than an atheist; etc. In addition, there is no objective, perspective-neutral standard that can be used to adjudicate which perspective is right.

Sextus Empiricus writes:

"Since the same things appear differently according to the difference in animals, it will be possible for us to say how the external object appears to us, but as to how it is in reality we shall suspend judgment. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own ideas and those of other animals, being ourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge [...] Since ideas differ according to the difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external objects."

Below is an attempt to capture Sextus Empiricus' argument in this passage:

(P1) Different animals will perceive the world differently.
(P2) There is no objective, perspective-neutral standard that can be used to determine which perception of the world is correct.
So,
(P3) We should suspend judgment about which perception of the world is correct.
Therefore,
(C) We should suspend judgment about how the world really is. We should train the mind to avoid having beliefs about the world (including issues moral, political, scientific, spiritual).